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Abstract 
 
Consistent with the premise that make-whole call provisions enhance value-creating financial 
flexibility, we find that higher sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock price (delta) increases the 
likelihood that corporate bonds contain make-whole provisions. Building on the results of related 
research, post-issue financial performance of make-whole callable bond issuers increases in delta. 
In line with prior findings that demonstrate financial flexibility can be costly to bondholders, we 
find that managerial equity incentives impact the incremental effect of make-whole provisions on 
the pricing of corporate debt securities. Consistent with the flexibility explanation, we also find 
that the market response as measured by abnormal trading volume to the issuance of make-whole 
callable debt varies in equity incentives. Overall, our results suggest that managerial incentives 
play a role in the choice, pricing, and market response to make-whole options in corporate debt 
securities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Both practitioners and the academic finance literature have underlined the value of 
financial flexibility. Defined as a firm’s ability to access and restructure its financing at low cost 
(Gamba and Triantis, 2008), flexibility is valuable because it creates a range of alternative 
responses to unexpected investment opportunities or negative cash flow shocks (Almeida, 
Campbello and Weisbach, 2011; DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Whited, 2011). An extensive agency 
theory literature argues that CEO compensation should be aligned to firm performance (e.g. 
Grossman and Hart, 1983; Jensen and Murphy, 1990) to provide an incentive for CEOs to act in 
the best interest of shareholders. Thus, to the extent that greater financial flexibility ultimately 
creates value for shareholders in the face of unanticipated negative financing or cash flow shocks, 
managerial incentive compensation should play a role in corporate financial decisions that enhance 
flexibility. In this study, we investigate the hitherto unexplored role of managerial equity 
incentives in the use, and market pricing, of a specific but increasingly prevalent, flexibility-
enhancing decision: the choice to include a make-whole call provision in a bond issue. 
The make-whole call feature is a relatively recent financial innovation that has come into 
increasingly widespread international use. As Afik, Jacoby, Stangeland and Wu (2019) discuss, 
the make-whole provision can be traced to the ‘Canada-call’ provision beginning in 1987 when 
Domtar Inc. issued a CAN$100 million 24-year maturity debenture that contained a make-whole 
call. This preceded the first issue (by Quaker State) of a make-whole callable bond in the US by 
eight years (Mann and Powers, 2003). As documented by Labbé (2014), the use of the make-whole 
call in Europe began in 2001 with a Euro bond issued by AT&T and by 2012 was being issued by 
large European firms including Pirellli, Vivendi, Michelin, and France Telecom among others. 
Rather than following a fixed-price schedule, a make-whole call price is the present value of the 
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remaining cash flows at the maturity-matched Treasury yield plus a small, contractually fixed 
spread. In practice, make-whole calls also differ from traditional calls in that they are typically 
written deep out-of-the money. Therefore, potential motivations to use make-whole call provisions 
differ from those applying to traditional fixed-price calls. By compensating bond buyers for any 
market-wide drop in interest rates, the make-whole provision virtually eliminates the call’s value 
as an option on interest rates. The issuer does retain an option on the credit spread, but the typical 
out-of-the money structure makes it very unlikely that credit quality will improve enough to justify 
exercise. In light of this structure and practice, recent studies focusing on the use and pricing of 
make-whole call provisions infer that the principal motivation for issuers to include a make-whole 
call feature is to increase financial flexibility.  
An extensive executive equity compensation literature rests on the premise that pay-for-
performance compensation better aligns managers’ interests with those of shareholders, thus 
incentivizing value maximizing decisions. Indeed, as Core, Guay and Larcker (2003, p. 32) note, 
“A fundamental reason for the use of equity incentives is the desire by firms to link changes in 
executive wealth directly to changes in stock price, thereby providing executives with incentives 
to maximize shareholder wealth.” We follow this literature and use executive pay-for-performance 
sensitivity as a proxy for the value-maximizing quality of managerial decisions associated with the 
use of a make-whole call. Based on the premise that financial flexibility contributes to shareholder 
value, we anticipate that greater managerial-shareholder incentive alignment directly affects the 
use of make-whole call provisions. This effect should be particularly strong for firms with greater 
growth opportunities for whom there is more to be gained from higher levels of flexibility (Gamba 
and Triantis, 2008). Powers and Tsyplakov (2008) argue that the enhanced flexibility provided by 
a make-whole call comes from the cap it places on the cost of retiring debt early, relative to the 
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alternative of a tender offer. They provide evidence that make-whole provisions are associated 
with an increased yield to maturity commensurate with the cap on potential bondholder gains 
implied by the call. Extending these findings, we expect that the impact of make-whole call 
provisions on bond yield spreads is increasing in managerial equity incentives. 
Overall, our empirical results support these expectations and extend findings in prior 
research by demonstrating a flexibility-driven motivation for the use of make-whole call 
provisions that is linked to shareholder-manager incentive alignment. First, we find that 
managerial equity incentives are significantly associated with the use of make-whole call 
provisions. Subsample analysis affirms the robustness of the financial flexibility explanation: the 
equity incentive effect becomes stronger for firms with greater growth potential, where the value 
created from flexibility should be greatest, but diminishes for firms nearer default, where both 
managerial equity incentives and the make-whole call provision become less effective. In line with 
these findings, post-issue financial performance of make-whole call issuers increases in equity 
incentives. Next, building on prior findings that demonstrate greater flexibility is potentially costly 
to bondholders, we identify a differential effect on the yield spread of bonds with make-whole 
provisions that varies in the degree of managerial equity incentives. Finally, consistent with the 
notion that higher equity incentives provide a clearer indication to market participants about the 
underlying motivation for a make-whole provision, abnormal relative trading volume is decreasing 
in equity incentives. Viewed collectively, our results support the view that equity incentives 
enhance the motivation for managers to use flexibility-enhancing make-whole provisions in debt 
securities. 
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We structure the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 of the paper reviews related 
literature while Section 3 develops the hypotheses to be tested. We describe the data and 
methodology in Section 4, empirical results in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
A well-developed literature proposes various explanations for the use of fixed-price call 
provisions, including interest risk hedging (Pye, 1966; Güntay, Prabhala and Unal, 2004), 
mitigating asymmetric information (Robbins and Schatzberg, 1986), debt overhang and 
underinvestment (Bodie and Taggart, 1978; Myers, 1977; Parrino and Weisbach, 1999), alleviating 
risk-shifting or asset substitution (Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
tax effects (Marshall and Yawitz, 1980; Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner, 1989), and investment 
hedging (Chen, Mao and Wang, 2010) among others. The structure and typical terms of a make-
whole call provision differ from the traditional fixed-price call provision in ways that preclude 
many of these previously suggested motives, thereby suggesting the two types of calls play 
different roles in financial structure. The make-whole call price is not fixed, but is the present value 
of the outstanding coupon payments calculated using a current treasury rate plus a contractually 
fixed premium that typically varies between 0 and 50 basis points (Brown and Powers, 2018), or 
about 15 percent of the prevailing corporate credit spread with a ceiling of typically 50 basis points 
and a floor call price of par value (Powers and Tsyplakov, 2008; Powers and Sarkar, 2012). Thus, 
the make-whole call provides the issuer no protection against a drop in interest rates so interest 
rate risk hedging is not a motive for its use. Moreover, make-whole call provisions are typically 
written deep out of the money (Mann and Powers, 2004; Powers and Tsyplakov, 2008; Powers 
and Sarkar, 2013). Thus, although the issuer retains an option on credit quality, the likelihood that 
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this will change enough to justify exercise is remote.1 With exercise highly unlikely, the make-
whole call loses the capacity to mitigate asymmetric information or agency problems by limiting 
ex post wealth transfers to bondholders resulting from these situations. Consistent with this 
observation, Alderson, Lin and Stock (2017) provide evidence that issuers with potential 
bondholder-shareholder agency conflicts are more likely to use fixed-price call provisions rather 
than make-whole provisions.2  
On the other hand, writing make-whole options so deeply out of the money makes their up-
front cost to the issuer very low. Because interest rate risk hedging and mitigating agency issues 
cannot explain the use of make-whole calls, Brown and Powers (2018) argue that make-whole 
provisions instead can provide valuable financial flexibility for issuers through two primary 
channels. First, a make-whole call provision allows the issuer to engage in precautionary 
refinancing at any point in the bond’s life at a cost that is much lower than a fixed-price call 
provision. They report evidence supporting this conjecture: make-whole callable bond issuers are 
smaller, less liquid, and have lower credit ratings. Further, they have capital structures with 
concentrated maturities, are less likely to have alternative financing sources, and are more opaque. 
Second, Brown and Powers (2018) argue that make-whole call options provide a mechanism for 
greater flexibility around corporate events such as mergers and acquisitions and divestitures by 
facilitating the early retirement of existing debt by capping the price of a successful bond tender 
offer. They find that make-whole issuers are more likely to be future takeover targets as measured 
by incorporation in Delaware, greater debt, lower market-book ratios, and higher profitability. 
Consistent with these findings, Nayar and Stock (2008) report that make-whole callable issuers 
experience superior post-issue stock returns compared to non-callable bond issuers.  
Page 6 of 63Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
6 
 
The impact of a make-whole provision on bond pricing is consistent with the financial 
flexibility argument. Powers and Tsyplakov (2008) argue that the rapid increase in make-whole 
callable debt issuance suggests that the benefits of greater flexibility exceed the higher incremental 
yield of a make-whole provision. The higher yield is compensation for lost potential gains from a 
tender offer in the event of early retirement. Additionally, the higher yield reflects compensation 
for frictions related to early debt retirement such as capital gains taxes incurred when the call price 
exceeds the investor’s basis value and portfolio rebalancing costs for institutional investors. 
Powers and Tsyplakov (2008) predict an incremental effect associated with a make-whole 
provision of slightly over 5 basis points, while their regression analysis estimates an incremental 
effect of 13-24 basis points. 
Taken together, this literature suggests the make-whole call option serves as a mechanism 
to improve financial flexibility. As such, research focusing on the make-whole provision expands 
the evidence on the value of financial flexibility by considering a corporate decision variable 
beyond debt capacity and cash policy choices examined in prior research (e.g. Chen, Harford and 
Lin, 2017).  
 
3. Hypotheses and Data 
3.1 Hypotheses 
Survey evidence indicates that managers place great value on financial flexibility (e.g. 
Graham and Harvey, 2001; Brounen, de Jong and Koedijk, 2004; Bancel and Matoo, 2004). The 
academic finance literature provides both theoretical justification (Gamba and Triantis, 2008) and 
empirical support for the notion that financial flexibility increases growth opportunities (e.g. 
Rajput, Wongchoti, Chen and Faff, 2019) and firm value (Rapp, Schmid and Urban, 2014; Arslan-
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Ayaydin, Florackis and Ozkan, 2014), arguing that flexibility results in greater freedom to respond 
to unexpected negative cash flow shocks or to investment, acquisition, or financing opportunities. 
In looking for evidence that financial flexibility motivates use of make-whole calls, we pay 
particular attention to the fact that increasing flexibility, i.e. increasing the range of available 
actions, accentuates the role of managerial decisions. We posit that the shareholder value created 
by flexibility increases with the quality of those managerial decisions and, following agency 
theory, that equity incentives improve these decisions by aligning managerial incentives toward 
maximizing the value of equity. The better decisions induced by higher managerial incentives 
impact the use of make-whole call provisions through two potential channels that are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. First, better motivated managers can be expected to make better 
decisions in the future (i.e., subsequent to bond issue); in particular, they will be expected to make 
more effective use of the financial flexibility afforded by a make-whole call option to maximize 
shareholder value. Second, better motivated managers make better decisions at the time of issue – 
in particular, they are more likely to include shareholder value enhancing features, such as the 
make-whole call option. Both of these channels – i.e., the greater value a make-whole call brings 
when managers are motivated in their future decisions, and the greater propensity of currently 
motivated managers to seize the opportunity to create value at the time of issue – imply a make-
whole call option will be more often included when managerial equity incentives are stronger. This 
argument motivates Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1: Managerial equity incentives are positively associated with the choice to 
use a make-whole call provision.  
The postulated relation between executive equity incentives and the quality of future 
decision-making associated with make-whole provisions generates several additional testable 
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subset-based hypotheses. To the extent that anticipated future managerial decisions influence 
make-whole call choice, then the association between managerial equity incentives and the use of 
make-whole provisions should be moderated by firm characteristics that weaken (strengthen) the 
importance of these decisions. Closer proximity to bankruptcy should be associated with less 
manager-shareholder interest alignment and therefore a weakened sensitivity between managerial 
equity incentives and the use of the make-whole call option for two potential reasons.3 First, make-
whole premiums are treated as unmatured interest in the event of a bankruptcy, and the payment 
of unmatured interest in a bankruptcy is disallowed under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.4 Therefore, restrictions on an issuer’s ability to prepay make-whole callable debt may 
diminish the hypothesized association between executive incentives and the use of make-whole 
provisions in financially distressed firms. Second, extant work argues that financial distress 
associated with high debt exacerbates manager-shareholder incentive misalignment. For example, 
Ortiz-Molina (2007) finds that capital structure affects CEO incentives where pay-performance 
sensitivity declines in the proportion of straight debt, thereby supporting the view that firms trade 
off shareholder-manager incentive alignment in order to reduce shareholder-bondholder conflicts 
of interest that increase in the proportion of non-convertible debt financing. These arguments 
motivate Hypothesis 1a: 
Hypothesis 1a: The positive relation between equity incentives and make-whole call 
choice weakens with increased default risk. 
Next, Gamba and Triantis (2008) develop a theoretical framework that analyzes the effect 
of flexibility on firm value. Their model predicts, among others, that firms with high levels of 
financial flexibility should be valued at a premium relative to less flexible firms and that the 
premium should be significantly larger for younger firms with significant opportunity for upside 
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growth. Following this view, we postulate that the quality of future managerial decisions regarding 
use of the make-whole call option increases in importance for firms with greater growth 
opportunities. To the extent managerial incentives drive the choice to increase financial flexibility, 
the effect should be greater for firms with greater growth prospects as predicted by Hypothesis 1b: 
Hypothesis 1b: The positive relation between equity incentives and make-whole call 
choice strengthens in firms with higher growth potential. 
We consider more direct evidence that managerial engagement subsequent to make-whole 
callable bond issue increases with managerial equity compensation. Nayar and Stock (2008) 
demonstrate that issuers of make-whole callable bonds have superior post-issue stock returns and 
are more likely to have positive analyst revisions in the long-term growth rate. Based on the central 
role played by equity incentives in the financial flexibility explanation of make-whole provisions, 
a natural extension of Nayar and Stocks’ (2008) findings is to hypothesize that post-issue 
performance of make-whole callable bond issuers varies according to the extent of managerial 
incentives. To the extent higher pay-performance sensitivity incentivizes greater engagement and 
higher quality future decision-making, then Hypothesis 2 predicts make-whole issuers with higher 
equity incentives will have better post-issue performance:  
Hypothesis 2: Post-issue improvement in corporate performance and growth subsequent 
to issue increases with the level of managerial equity incentives. 
A related question is if managerial equity incentives play a role in the pricing of make-
whole call provisions in debt securities. To answer this question, we build on the findings of 
Powers and Tsyplakov (2008), who report that the early-retirement flexibility provided by make-
whole call provisions is associated with a small but positive effect on at-issue bond yields. A 
significant part of the advantage shareholders derive from the make-whole call option results 
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because the option limits the portion of the benefits of financial flexibility that are shared with 
bondholders (Brown and Powers, 2018); the findings of Powers and Tsyplakov (2008) are 
consistent with this limiting effect. Therefore, if better motivated managers are expected to more 
effectively use the make-whole call option to limit such bond holder gains, then the incremental 
effect of make-whole provisions on at-issue yield spreads should increase in executive equity 
compensation as predicted by Hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 3: The incremental effect of the make-whole call provision on bond yield 
spread is positively associated with managerial equity incentives. 
The financial flexibility explanation also has implications for the nature of the information 
conveyed to the equity market by the issue of a bond with a make-whole call option. Trading 
volume is an indicator of the precision of this information. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) argue that 
trading volume captures willingness of investors to transact. While trading volume increases on 
the arrival of company-specific information (e.g. Bamber, Barron and Stevens, 2011; Hong and 
Stein, 2007), Karpoff (1986) argues that investors’ willingness to trade arises from dispersion in 
prior expectations and idiosyncratic interpretation of information events. In a similar vein, Kandel 
and Pearson (1995) asserts that trading activity is stimulated when investors share, but interpret 
differently, the same public information. The previous hypotheses rest on the argument that higher 
levels of executive equity compensation are expected to lead to future uses of financial flexibility 
that are, on average, more advantageous for shareholders. It seems natural to extend this argument 
to postulate that the variance of these decisions around the optimum will also be reduced when 
managers are better motivated. This leads to the conjecture that higher levels of executive equity 
compensation create the expectation of more consistent decision-making, which reduces investor 
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disagreement about the valuation impact of the bond issue, and therefore the volume of trade 
around the time of issue as predicted by Hypothesis 4:  
Hypothesis 4: The volume of stock market trade in reaction to the issue of a bond with a 
make-whole provision decreases with managerial equity incentives. 
3.2 Sample selection and data 
We empirically examine the predictions of our testable hypotheses using a broad sample 
of at-issue bonds drawn from the the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database (SDC) and the 
Mergent Fixed Income Securities Issues Database (FISD). The sample period covers 1995-2017 
where the starting year is based on the advent of make-whole callable bond issuance in the US 
market. We obtain equity incentive information for the CEO and top management team from the 
Execucomp database which covers active S&P 1500 companies plus companies that were once 
part of the S&P 1500 but still trading. We measure incentive alignment with shareholders (Delta) 
as the change in the dollar value of equity incentives (current and previously granted option and 
equity compensation) to a 0.01 change in stock price using the approximation method described 
by Core and Guay (2002).5 
 As discussed by Powers (2016), there are distinct differences in corporate bond coverage 
between SDC and FISD. For example, SDC has better coverage of investment grade corporate 
debt while FISD has a broader array of high yield bonds. To examine the broadest possible range 
of primary market US corporate debt, we aggregate the two databases and eliminate duplicate 
issues on the basis of issuer, issue date, final maturity, and coupon. Following Powers and 
Tsyplakov (2008) and Brown and Powers (2018), we exclude bonds with maturity under three 
years, offering amount less than $10 million, and bonds issued as registered replacements for Rule 
144a bonds using information from FISD. We also exclude convertibles, bonds for which there is 
Page 12 of 63Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
12 
 
no conventional yield to maturity (e.g. floating and step-up coupon bonds), and bonds with 
synthetic features and exotic structures. As the motivations for- and benefits from financial 
flexibility may be different in regulated industries, we exclude issuers classified as financial (6000 
≤ SIC ≤ 6999) and utilities (4900 ≤ SIC ≤ 4999) throughout the study. 
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the sample selection process that results in the 7,657 bond 
level observations that appear in the broadest multinomial logistic regression model (Table 5 
Columns 4-5), and the 6,266 observations that are used in the broadest at-issue yield spread 
regression model (Table 10 Columns 4-5). Table 2 provides summary statistics for variables used 
throughout the analyses. Characterizing a bond as make-whole callable and fixed-price callable is 
complicated by the existence of many bonds that contain features of both provisions. For example, 
a bond may have a make-whole call provision for the first several years of a bond’s life which is 
followed by a standard fixed-price call prov sion. As a result, overlapping call provision features 
would confound the interpretation of our multinomial estimates. Similar to the process described 
by Brown and Powers (2018, pp. 13-14), we employ a ‘dominant characteristic’ classification 
scheme using information provided by the FISD and SDC datasets to classify bonds into three 
categories according to whether a provision is exercisable over a supermajority (2/3s or more) of 
the bond’s life. We define make-whole callable bonds as (1) those that are always make-whole 
callable or (2) make-whole callable with a fixed-price call in the final third of the bond’s life. We 
define bonds that are fixed-price callable as (1) callable immediately, where the first call date is 
less than 90 days after the issue date, or (2) with call protection, where the first call date is at least 
90 days after the issue date, or (3) with make-whole call protection. Straight bonds do not have 
either call feature.  
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Figure 1 demonstrates the proportions of each bond type by year over the 1995-2017 period 
in our primary at-issue sample. The increasing prevalence of make-whole callable bonds depicted 
in Figure 1 in our sample corroborates extant research documenting the growing usage of bonds 
with make-whole provisions (e.g. Elsaify and Roussanov, 2016; Brown and Powers, 2018; 
Alderson, Lin and Stock, 2017; Afik et al., 2019). In aggregate, Table 2 Panel A1 illustrates that 
about 59 percent of the bonds in this sample are make-whole callable, 20 percent are fixed-price 
callable, and 21 percent are non-callable. In Panel A2, we provide characteristics of bond-level 
control variables used in the multinomial logit analyses. The typical (median) bond has a time to 
maturity of 10 years and an offering amount of $500 million. About 17.6 percent are issued without 
a public registration statement and therefore limited to trading among qualified institutional 
investors under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 144a.  
Table 2 Panel B1 reports equity incentive summary statistics for the CEO and aggregate 
top management team. Consistent with the findings of Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) and 
related work, CEO delta within our sample of public debt issuers is heavily skewed with a mean 
(median) of $2,425,000 ($503,000). Turning to the additional firm-level financial variables in 
Panel B2, we calculate capital structure granularity using the “GRAN1” measure described by 
Choi, Hackbarth and Zechner (2017). Granularity is the inverse of the Herfindahl index of bond 
maturity fractions of all bonds outstanding for a given firm in a given year. Median granularity in 
our sample is 2.880. Following Güntay, Prabhala,and Unal (2004), we measure exposure of 
operating income to interest rates with Stock – Treasury correlation, defined as the correlation 
between the issuer’s weekly stock returns and the 10-year Treasury rate over the two years prior 
to the issue date. Similar to Brown and Powers (2018) who report positive values for make-whole 
and fixed-price call provision issuers, the median correlation is 0.138 over our sample period. We 
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gauge growth potential alternatively with the market-book ratio and past (five-year) sales growth. 
Firm size is the logged sum of the market capitalization of equity, long-term debt, and current 
maturities of long-term debt. Liquidity is cash scaled by total assets. Following Brown and Powers 
(2018), we include a binary variable for incorporation in Delaware, leverage, measures of 
profitability and cash flow volatility, asset tangibility, and risk-adjusted cumulated stock return 
using the CRSP value-weighted measured over the 225 days ending at the day prior to the issue 
date. Following Mansi, Maxwell and Miller (2011), we measure information asymmetry with the 
number of analysts following the issuer’s stock obtained from the IBES database.  
Table 2 Panel C provides descriptive statistics for additional variables used in the 
subsequent yield spread analyses. At the bond level, the typical (median) rated bond has a Moody’s 
rating of Baa1 and a modified duration of 6.987. About 4.2 percent are subordinated, and a small 
percentage have embedded put options. Firm-level control variables include a binary variable if 
the firm reported negative income for the year of the bond issue, and Industry Concentration as 
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Finally, Panel D provides measures of the 
macroeconomic interest rate environment at the time of issuance. These include the slope of the 
10-year Treasury yield, the 10-year Treasury spot rate and volatility of the 10-year rate, and the 
Baa-Aaa index obtained from the Federal Reserve St. Louis Data Repository (FRED). The 
Appendix provides additional details for these variables.  
 
4. Empirical Methodology and Results 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
In Table 3 Panel A, we examine if characteristics of make-whole callable (MWC) and 
fixed-price callable (FPC) bond issuers differ from those that issue straight debt in a univariate 
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context. We focus on the firm-level measures presented in Table 2 Panels B1-B2, and C. Viewed 
collectively, the results of Table 3 demonstrate that MWC and FPC issuers differ sharply from 
straight debt issuers. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the results provided in Panel A illustrate that 
MWC issuers have significantly higher executive delta compared to straight and FPC debt issuers. 
Consistent with the interest rate hedging explanation for call provisions, MWC issuers have greater 
correlation between their stock returns and Treasury rates. While MWC issuers have slightly lower 
past growth in sales than FPC debt issuers, their market-book ratio is substantially higher at the 
time of issue. MWC issuers also tend to be tend to be larger. Consistent with the flexibility 
explanation, they have more cash holdings and less debt on their balance sheets than straight or 
FPC issuers. While MWC issuers have higher cash flow risk than straight debt issuers, they have 
significantly less compared to FPC bond issuers. Consistent with Brown and Powers’ (2018) 
conjecture that the financial flexibility associated with the MWC provision becomes more valuable 
when firms are more likely to be acquired, MWC issuers are more likely to be incorporated in 
Delaware. Finally, MWC issuers have a higher quality information environment based on analyst 
coverage.  
In Table 3 Panel B, we examine univariate differences for the measures presented in Table 
2 Panel C. These results reveal further distinctions between MWC and FPC bonds. Consistent with 
past findings, yield spreads on MWC bonds are higher than straight bonds but much lower than 
FPC bonds. In a similar vein, Moody’s ratings on MWC bonds are slightly lower than straight 
bonds but significantly higher than FPC debt. MWC bonds have the highest duration of the three 
categories and are less likely to be subordinated. While MWC bonds are slightly more likely to 
have reported negative net income than straight bond issuers, they are much less likely compared 
to FPC issuers. Viewed collectively, Table 3 illustrates that MWC issuers have higher delta and 
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exhibit characteristics associated with greater financial flexibility, while FPC issuers have lower 
delta and have characteristics associated with greater cash flow uncertainty and higher credit risk.  
4.2. Managerial incentives and call provision choice: multinomial logit analysis 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that managerial equity incentives are positively associated with the 
choice to use a make-whole call provision. This is, if make-whole call provisions enhance financial 
flexibility, and to the extent greater flexibility ultimately creates value for shareholders, then the 
choice to include a make-whole call provision should be increasing in manager-shareholder 
interest alignment as gauged by managerial equity incentives. We examine the robustness of 
Hypothesis 1 by contrasting the Delta effect using a fixed price call binary variable as the 
dependent variable, which also provides financial flexibility (e.g. Xu, 2018) but at the expense of 
a costly interest rate option. We calculate the probability of issuer j including a make-whole call 
provision (alternatively, fixed-price call provision) in bond i in year t in a multi-equation 
framework using a multinomial logistic regression as follows: 
𝑀𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡(𝐹𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 −
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑎 − 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 30 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +𝑖 ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +𝑖 𝑒𝑖   
 
 (1) 
The binary MWC and FPC response variables are defined according to the definitions 
described above, while straight bonds comprise the base categor . We measure Delta at the CEO 
level and alternatively at the top management level. The bond- and firm-level control variables 
broadly control for the financial flexibility, interest rate hedging, and other explanations for call 
provision choices explored in prior research and follow specifications used by Brown and Powers 
(2018) and related work including Mann and Powers (2003), Powers and Tsyplakov (2008), 
Alderson, Lin and Stock (2017), and Skinner and Gounopoulos (2014). At the bond level, Log 
(Time to maturity) measures refinancing risk, while logged Offering amount controls for interest 
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rate exposure (Chen et al., 2010). Rule 144a controls for systematic effects linked to privately-
traded bonds such as lower liquidity (Livingston and Zhou, 2002). 
At the firm level, capital structure granularity controls for firm-level refinancing risk (Choi, 
et al. 2017) while Stock– Treasury corr. is the correlation between the issuer’s weekly stock return 
and the weekly 10-year Treasury spot rate measured over two years prior to the issue date and 
gauges exposure of earnings to interest rates (Güntay et al., 2004). Sales growth and Market-book 
ratio control for realized and expected growth opportunities, respectively, at the year of the 
offering; Chen et al. (2010) find evidence that firms with lower future growth opportunities are 
more likely to use call provisions, supporting the notion that call provisions can be used to hedge 
investment uncertainty. According to Kish and Livingston (1992) and Banko and Zhao (2010), 
bond credit risk and firm debt ratios are typically used to control for agency-based explanations 
for callable bond issuance. In addition, Brown and Powers (2018) examine the corporate event 
flexibility hypothesis with a set of similar variables that describe the likelihood of a firm being 
targeted in an M&A event. Other control variables used by extant research to control for the firm’s 
creditworthiness, as well as to distinguish between the refinancing risk and corporate event 
flexibility hypotheses (Brown and Powers, 2018), include Firm size, Liquidity, Leverage, ROA, 
Std. (ROA), Tangibility, Risk-adjusted stock return, and incorporation in Delaware. As described 
above, Analyst coverage controls for the effect of the information environment on call provision 
choices (Banko and Zhou, 2010). In Table 4, we provide pairwise correlations between these firm-
level characteristics. Consistent with prior findings (e.g. Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006), higher 
delta is significantly associated with larger firms, higher growth and prior stock return, higher 
profitability, and lower earnings volatility. In untabulated analysis, the variance inflation factors 
Page 18 of 63Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
18 
 
among these measures range from 3.59 (Firm size) to 1.03 (Delaware), indicating that our 
subsequent logistic regression coefficient estimates are reliable and stable. 
Table 5 presents the multinomial regression estimates for Equation (1). All explanatory 
variables are winsorized at the one percent tails. We include fixed effects for industry and year, 
and cluster the robust standard errors at the firm level. We argue above that higher executive equity 
incentives potentially affect make-whole call choice through two channels, where equity 
incentives (1) motivate better use of the flexibility associated with the MWC provision in the future 
when opportunities to make use of financial flexibility arise, and (2) motivate managers to choose 
valuable flexibility-increasing options for the firm at the time of the bond issue that may include 
MWC debt. Given this distinction in timing, Columns 2-5 measure equity incentives using logged 
Delta at the time of the issue, while Columns 6-9 use logged Delta lagged one year. Although the 
two channels are not mutually exclusive, and lagged and contemporaneous delta are correlated, 
we would expect to see a stronger effect from contemporaneous Delta if expected future decision 
quality is most important (Channel 1), and from the lagged Delta if decision quality at the time of 
issue matters more (Channel 2).  Consistent with the notion that the improved flexibility associated 
with a make-whole call provision is motivated by higher contemporaneous equity incentives and 
the empirical prediction of Hypothesis 1, Columns 2-5 demonstrate that CEO and, alternatively, 
top management Delta is a significant determinant of make-whole callable debt. The logged CEO 
Delta coefficient of 0.143 in the MWC group corresponds to an (untabulated) average marginal 
effect of 0.0279. Because CEO Delta is logged, we multiply by 0.1 to derive the average change 
in the probability when delta increases by approximately 10 percent. Therefore, the average 
increase in the probability of the choice to use a make-whole provision is about 0.279 percentage 
points given a 10 percent increase in CEO delta.6 Similarly, the logged Top management delta 
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estimate of 0.157 in the MWC group corresponds to an (untabulated) average marginal effect of 
0.0304. Thus, the average increase in the probability of the choice to use a make-whole provision 
is about 0.304 percentage points given a 10 percent increase in top management delta. In contrast, 
the Delta coefficient estimates are insignificantly different from zero in the respective FPC 
categories. As evidenced by the lagged Delta estimates in Columns 6-9, there is evidence that 
Channel (2) is also at work with respect to MWC choice. However, the contemporaneous CEO- 
and top management Delta estimates in Models 1-4 are larger and of greater statistical significance. 
As such, these results suggest that the aggregate effect is best measured by contemporaneous delta. 
Therefore, we base the subsequent analyses on the contemporaneous Delta. 
Comparison of the coefficient estimates between MWC and FPC groups reveals additional 
commonalities and differences compared to the straight bond base category. For example, while 
MWC bonds are associated with larger offering amounts, both types of calls are associated with 
longer times to maturity. MWC (FPC) provisions are less (more) common with Rule 144a debt. 
MWC debt is associated with firms with less granular capital structures, while FPC debt is more 
likely to be issued by firms with greater stock return - Treasury rate correlation. Consistent with 
our univariate findings, FPC issuers are smaller and have characteristics associated with greater 
credit risk including higher leverage, lower profitability, and higher volatility in earnings.  
Potential endogeneity between equity incentives and the choice to include make-whole call 
features in newly issued debt resulting from omitted variables or simultaneous causality may 
confound the multinomial results of Table 5. As a test of robustness for Hypothesis 1, we employ 
an instrumental variables (IV) probit methodology using maximum likelihood estimation. The IV 
approach uses instruments to isolate changes in managerial equity incentives that are uncorrelated 
with the error term in Equation (1). This uncorrelated component creates an unbiased coefficient 
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for equity incentives in the probit regression. We construct instruments for managerial equity 
incentives based on prior research showing that equity incentives are correlated with 
geographically proximate firms (Bouwman, 2013), that the intensity of interlocking directorates 
have a direct effect on compensation (Gallani, 2016), and that CEO experience and skills 
contribute to the equity portion of executive compensation (Cremers and Palia, 2011). We create 
a measure of pay-performance sensitivity of geographically proximate firms by calculating the 
average delta of all firms headquartered within the same state. We construct a proxy for the 
intensity of each firm’s connections to other firms by calculating the number of publicly listed 
firms headquartered in the firm’s standard federal (i.e., GSA) region using the LexisNexis 
database.7 Finally, we use the logged number of years that the CEO has held the position to 
measure experience.  
Table 6 provides the IV probit estimates for the CEO and top management equity incentive 
measures where the dependent variable equals one (zero) if the bond is MWC (straight), 
respectively. We report descriptive statistics for the three instruments in Panel A, and first-stage 
estimates in Panel B. Consistent with our expectations, the three instruments are positive and 
significantly related to managerial equity incentives. In Panel C, we report the second stage 
estimates. Consistent with the multinomial logit estimates, the IV estimates are positive and 
statistically significant at the five percent level in both models. The Wald test of exogeneity 
examines if there is significance correlation between the error terms of the structural and reduced-
form equations. For Models 1-2, the chi-square statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity, indicating that a single equation approach is appropriate. The Anderson LR statistic 
rejects the null hypothesis of weak instruments. Finally, the Hansen J statistic tests the null 
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hypothesis that the overidentification restrictions are valid. The J statistic p-values suggest the 
instruments are well-identified and relevant.  
Hypothesis 1a predicts that financial distress affects the association between equity 
incentives and make-whole call provision choice based on the dual rationales that make-whole 
exercise may be restricted in bankruptcy based on the treatment of make-whole premiums as 
unmatured interest, and that firms with high debt may trade off shareholder-manager incentive 
alignment to reduce shareholder-bondholder agency conflicts. We use alternative measures of 
financial distress to investigate this premise. First, we gauge creditworthiness at the firm level 
using the Standard & Poor’s Quality Ranking (Compustat item SPCSRC), which varies in eight 
categories from ‘D’ to ‘A+’ and provides a stock’s relative standing based on the past performance 
of a stock’s earnings and dividends. Unlike other Standard & Poor’s measures such as the Long 
Term Issuer Credit Ranking (SPLTICRM), the Quality Ranking is available for a wide variety of 
firms. In addition, we alternatively gauge proximity to distress using the Moody’s rating obtained 
from the FISD / SDC databases. In Table 7 Columns 2-4, we segment the sample by the Quality 
Ranking: ‘B+’ or higher (‘B’ or lower) is lesser (higher) likelihood of distress, respectively. The 
coefficient estimates support our expectations. Within the subset of issuers with at least ‘B+’ 
Quality Ranking, the logged CEO Delta estimate of 0.187 is significant at the five percent level. 
The (untabulated) marginal effect is 0.0301, implying that the average increase in the probability 
of the choice to use a make-whole provision in higher quality firms increases to about 0.301 
percentage points given a 10 percent increase in CEO delta. In contrast, the CEO Delta estimate 
among ‘B’ or lower Quality Ranking firms is insignificantly different from zero. In Columns 5-8, 
we segment the sample by investment grade (‘Baa3’ or higher) and high yield (‘Ba1’ or lower) 
Moody’s bond ratings. These results closely reflect the estimates using the Quality Ranking. 
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Hypothesis 1b predicts that the positive relation between equity incentives and make-whole 
call choice strengthens in firms with higher growth potential. We estimate growth opportunities 
using past growth in sales and the market-book ratio. In Table 8, we gauge relative high growth 
potential by combining these measures. In Columns 2-3, firms are classified as high growth when 
past sales growth and market-book are in the top terciles (HSG-HMB) of their respective cross-
sectional distributions. We test if the incremental association between equity incentives and the 
make-whole choice differs significantly for issuers within this subset by interacting HSG-HMB 
with logged CEO Delta (Model 1) and, alternatively, Top management delta (Model 2). In Model 
1, the logged CEO Delta × HSG-HMB interaction is positive and significant at the one percent 
level, demonstrating that high growth opportunities amplify the ability of equity incentives to 
predict the use of make-whole call provisions. We assess the economic interpretation of the 
interaction by estimating the logged CEO Delta effect in the HSG-HMB segment of the sample. 
The (untabulated) average CEO Delta marginal effect is 0.0883 implying that the average increase 
in the probability of the choice to use a make-whole provision in HSG-HMB firms is 0.883 
percentage points given a 10 percent increase in CEO delta. Model 2 provides qualitatively similar 
results using top management incentives. In Models 3-4, we follow Brown and Powers (2018) by 
adjusting these measures by industry. For each year, we calculate average sales growth and market-
book ratio by Fama-French 30 industry and year. For each issuer-year, we subtract sales growth 
and market-book ratio from its respective industry mean. We define high (low) growth firms as 
when both differences are positive (negative). Model 3 illustrates the Log (Delta) interaction using 
CEO equity incentives for high-growth issuers is positive and significant at the one percent level. 
Based on a (untabulated) marginal effect of 0.0933, the average increase in the probability of the 
choice to use a make-whole provision in HSG-HMB firms reaches 0.933 percentage points given 
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a 10 percent increase in CEO delta. These results are qualitatively similar in Model 4 using top 
management incentives.  
A natural question is if the positive incremental MWC effect among the highest Delta 
tercile issuers is associated with actual subsequent reductions in the amount outstanding due to 
call exercises or tender offers. While the SDC database does not provide this information, the FISD 
Redemptions file provides data items about the type of action that took place to change the amount 
outstanding (ACTION_TYPE), along with the date the change to the issue’s amount outstanding 
became effective (EFFECTIVE_DATE). We examine the impact of Delta on the probability of a 
reduction in amount outstanding due to early exercises (i.e. when ACTION_TYPE is “B”, “E”, or 
“P”), or “T” (tender offer) for all make-whole callable bonds and for growth-based subsets per the 
results in Table 8. To improve the efficiency of the estimates based on the lower number of 
observations, we gauge high and low growth using the cross-sectional medians. The controls are 
at the bond- (logged remaining maturity and offering amount), firm- (S&P Quality Ranking, 
growth measures, and size), and market levels (Baa-Aaa spread and yield curve slope). Consistent 
with the results provided in Table 8, our findings suggest that logged CEO delta (alternatively, top 
management delta) is significantly associated with early redemptions among higher growth MWC 
issuers, thereby providing more context for the channel that drives the association between MWC 
and equity incentives. For brevity we leave these results untabulated but they are available upon 
request. 
5.2 Managerial incentives and post-issue performance 
Extending the implications of Hypothesis 1 and building on the findings of prior related 
research showing that make-whole issuance is followed by higher stock returns and positive 
analyst revisions, Hypothesis 2 posits that post-issue improvement in corporate performance and 
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growth subsequent to the issuance of make-whole callable debt is associated with the level of 
managerial equity incentives. To address this question, we employ a matched firm propensity score 
matching (PSM) approach. A firm may issue multiple bond issues in a given year while 
performance is measured at the firm-year level; therefore, we define a firm as a make-whole issuer 
if at least one bond issue during a given year contains a make-whole provision and the firm does 
not issue any fixed-price callable bonds during that year. The propensity score matching (PSM) 
methodology (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; 1985) controls for self-selection by matching treated 
firms with control firms with similar characteristics according to a function of covariates. The 
basic approach of propensity score matching is to first model make-whole call issuing (or treated) 
firms with firm-specific variables explaining the propensity for make-whole call issuance, and then 
to identify a comparable untreated sample of firms that are matched on their propensity scores. 
The key PSM result is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET), which is the average 
difference in the outcome (performance) variable between the treated and propensity score-
matched control firms. A key requirement of the PSM process is that the propensity score is 
balanced across the treatment and control groups. If the balancing property is not satisfied, then 
the treatment and comparison groups are unlikely to be sufficiently similar to reduce selection bias 
in the treatment effect estimate (e.g. Pinzon, 2015). To ensure that our PSM estimates meet the 
balancing requirement, we parsimoniously select covariates gauging performance, leverage, and 
firm size. We identify control firms from the Compustat database after excluding financials and 
utilities along with the set of MWC issuers. We estimate propensity scores based on the following 
model:   
𝑀𝑊𝐶 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡  (2) 
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 We examine three alternative outcome measures measured over the two years subsequent 
to the issue: top-line sales growth over the two-year post-issue period, and bottom-line 
performance as measured by ROA in t+1 and t+2 relative to issue year t.  The first covariate is 
motivated by Barber and Lyon (1996), who stress the importance of matching on pre-event 
operating performance to assess abnormal future performance. As such, we use ROA in year t 
(five-year prior growth in sales) as a matching covariate when the outcome measure is subsequent 
ROA (subsequent two-year sales growth, respectively). Following the arguments underlying 
Hypothesis 1a, the leverage ratio controls for proximity to distress. Finally, we include the firm 
size to mitigate biases related to size differences. Using the propensity scores estimated from 
Equation (2), we identify propensity score-matched control samples.8 PSM matching 
methodologies range from one-to-one to one-to-many; as discussed by Tucker (2010), there is no 
single best matching approach. We employ the nearest-neighbor approach with replacement using 
a caliper of 0.1, which identifies a single match for each treated firm according to the closest 
propensity score. For robustness, we repeat the analysis using five matched firms for each treated 
firm and present results in Panel C2.  
Table 9 provides the PSM average treatment effects for the overall sample of MWC issuers 
and for subsets of MWC issuers segmented by high and low (top and bottom tercile) CEO delta, 
respectively. Panel A provides results using ROAt+1 as the outcome variable. In Panel A1 using 
one-to-one matching, the the difference between treated and control firm average ROAt+1 is 0.0367 
(t-statistic=2.31). In the top delta tercile, the difference is 0.0196 (t-statistic=2.69); however, in the 
bottom delta tercile, this difference decreases to 0.0009 (t-statistic=0.10). This pattern becomes 
more distinctive in Panel A2 using one-to-five matching, where the difference in the highest tercile 
delta subset is 0.0377 and decreases to -0.0044 in the lowest tercile. Panel B provides similar 
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pattern of results using ROAt+2 as the outcome variable. In Panel C, we report results using two-
year growth in sales following the MWC issue year. In Panel C1 using one-to-one matching, the 
difference in two-year growth in sales between treated and control firms across the overall sample 
is -0.0121. However, within the top delta tercile, this difference is 0.0160 (t-statistic=1.59) and 
decreases to -0.0402 (t-statistic=-2.59) in the lowest delta tercile. These results continue in Panel 
C2, where the difference in two-year growth in sales for top delta tercile issuers is 0.0133 (t-
statistic=1.97) and -0.0363 (t-statistic=-4.07) in the lowest delta tercile. Overall, these results 
support the predictions of Hypothesis 2 and the notion that managerial engagement subsequent to 
make-whole callable bond issue increases with equity incentives. 
5.3. Managerial incentives, call provisions, and the pricing of at-issue corporate debt 
Powers and Tsyplakov (2008) provide evidence that make-whole bondholders require a 
small but positive at-issue premium in exchange for the risks associated with improved financial 
flexibility. We extend these findings by empirically examining the implications of Hypothesis 3. 
Based on their findings, we expect to find a positive association between make-whole call 
provisions and the marginal cost of debt. However, Hypothesis 3 predicts that the MWC effect 
increases in the amount of managerial equity incentives due to increased bondholder risk related 
to managerial incentives to improve flexibility. To test this hypothesis, we examine the incremental 
impact of make-whole callable debt on at-issue yield spreads drawn from the aggregated SDC-
FISD dataset using the following least-squares regression model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑜𝑝 − 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑎 −𝑖
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 30 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +𝑖 𝑒𝑖  
 
(3) 
  
Bond yield spreads are calculated as iCorp - iGov, where iCorp is the offering yield-to-maturity 
of the sample corporate bond provided by SDC or FISD and iGov is the interpolated yield-to-
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maturity for the point on the Treasury yield curve corresponding to the same time to maturity as 
the sample corporate bond. We obtain constant-maturity Treasury bond indices to calculate the 
yield spread from FRED.9 Along with the binary variable MWC, we control for the reinvestment 
risk associated with fixed-price callable debt (e.g., Ederington and Stock, 2002) with the FPC 
binary variable. In addition to many of the firm characteristics specified in Equation 1, we add the 
Moody’s bond rating due to its powerful impact on bond prices independent of the additional 
control variables. The inclusion of the rating along with the additional control variables reduces 
the final sample size to 6,266 at-issue observations as outlined in Table 1. Because the bond rating 
partially captures the information contained in the remaining bond- and firm-level control 
variables (e.g. Mansi, Maxwell and Miller, 2011), we utilize the Residual bond rating as the 
residual from regressing numerical Moody’s ratings on all other independent variables specified 
in Equation (3).  
Consistent with related work, the additional control variables are at the bond, firm, and 
macroeconomic levels. Among the additional bond-level control variables, logged Offering 
amount controls for liquidity: larger issues are associated with economies of scale in underwriting 
and reduction in liquidity risk (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). We control for interest rate risk with 
modified duration, defined as the first derivative of the price-yield function evaluated at the current 
yield to maturity divided by price. Subordinate is an indicator variable equal to one if the bond is 
subordinate to other debt issues, and should be positively related to rating as subordinate bonds 
have lower recovery rates in the event of bankruptcy, and Rule 144a controls for the effect of 
private trading on yield spreads (Livingston and Zhou, 2002). Putable hedges investors against 
interest rate risk and therefore should be negatively associated with yield spread.  
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We choose firm-level variables representing aspects of profitability and cash flow risk from 
an extensive literature that examines determinants of the cost of corporate debt (e.g. Bhojraj and 
Sengupta, 2003; Klock et al., 2005; Ortiz-Molina, 2006; Mansi et al., 2011). Based on the findings 
of Acharya, Davydenko and Strebulaev (2012), who argue that a conservative cash policy is more 
likely to be pursued by firms that are closer to distress, we expect Liquidity to be positively related 
to yield spread. Firm size gauges liquidity and information risks: larger issuers generally have 
greater market presence and are therefore of more interest to institutional investors. The proportion 
of long-term debt in the capital structure (Leverage) measures default risk. Market-book ratio and 
Sales growth measure realized growth and cash flow growth opportunities, respectively. ROA 
measures profitability, while the standard deviation of Profitability measures cash flow risk. As an 
additional measure of cash flow risk, we follow Ortiz-Molina (2006) by including a dummy 
variable equal to one when net income is negative. Asset tangibility represents greater 
collateralization to bondholders and should be negatively related to yield spread. Based on a line 
of research demonstrating that information asymmetry is perceived as a dimension of risk to 
bondholders (e.g. Lu, Chen and Liao, 2010), we control for the quality of the information 
environment with the number of analysts following the stock. Industry concentration is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and measures the extent of monopolistic pricing potential in the 
issuer’s industry. Finally, based on the specification of Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin 
(2001) who examine the determinants of credit spread changes, we include the set of 
macroeconomic variables used in our initial analyses that describe the interest rate environment at 
the time of issue: Yield curve slope, 10-year Treasury rate, Std. (10-year Treasury rate), and Baa 
- Aaa spread. The Appendix provides additional details for these variables. 
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Table 10 presents the least squares coefficient estimates for Equation (3). As in the prior 
analyses, all variables are winsorized at the one percent tails. In Model 1, we estimate a baseline 
effect for make-whole callable bonds. In line with Powers and Tsyplakov’s (2008) finding that 
make-whole call provisions are associated with a small incremental effect on yields averaging 
between 13 and 24 basis points, Model 1 demonstrates that the MWC coefficient estimate is 
associated with a 10 basis point incremental effect on yield spread. Consistent with the notion that 
interest rate hedging with a fixed-price call provision represents reinvestment risk for the investor, 
FPC is associated with a 65 basis point incremental effect. The remaining bond-level control 
variables are largely as predicted: Higher Residual bond rating has a strong negative effect on 
yield spread, while Rule 144a issues are associated with higher spread. With respect to firm 
financial characteristics, higher liquidity as measured by cash holdings positively affects spread. 
Likewise, Firm size, Leverage, Profitability, Std. (Profitability), Negative net income, and Analyst 
coverage have the expected signs and significance. 
We empirically examine the prediction of Hypothesis 3 that managerial equity incentives 
affect the intensity of the MWC-yield spread association by sorting the sample into terciles using 
incentives held by the CEO (Models 1-2) and top management (Models 3-4). We create a binary 
variable Top third delta if a given issuer is in the top delta tercile in a given year and interact this 
binary variable with MWC. As illustrated in Model 2, the statistically significant MWC× Top third 
delta estimate has a coefficient estimate of 0.0031, implying the incremental effect of top tercile 
CEO delta is 31 basis points and thereby demonstrating that bondholders associate higher equity 
incentives with a greater risk of early retirement associated with the make-whole call.  Models 3-
4 repeat this analysis using top management delta and report qualitatively similar results. In line 
with the results of Model 2, the baseline MWC effect in Model 4 is 11 basis points. In Model 4, 
Page 30 of 63Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
30 
 
the significant MWC× Top third delta estimate increases to 35 basis points. Overall, the results of 
Table 10 support the intuition that managerial equity incentives increase the perceived risks 
associated with make-whole callable debt to bondholders.  
5.4. Managerial incentives and the market reaction to make-whole callable bonds 
 To investigate the prediction of Hypothesis 4 and to enhance our contribution to extant 
research reporting significant wealth effects around make-whole callable bond issuance (Nayar 
and Stock, 2008), we investigate whether changes in trading incentive around the make-whole 
callable bond issuance date are associated with equity incentives. We examine issue date abnormal 
trading volume. We follow Beaver (1968), Morse (1981), and related research by defining market-
model relative abnormal volume as: 
𝐴𝑉𝑗,𝑡 =  𝑉𝑗,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑉𝑚𝑡)  (4) 
 
where  is number of shares of firm j traded on day t divided by number of shares outstanding 
and  is the aggregate number of shares traded on day t divided by total shares outstanding on 
day t. AVjt is (actual – predicted) volume, where predicted volume is based on the parameters  
and  estimated over the (-225,-2) period relative to the issue date. We examine daily and 
cumulated abnormal relative trading volume over a two-day window.10  
Because abnormal trading volume are measured with the issuers’ equity and since there 
may be more than one bond issue for a given issuer on a given date, we reduce the primary at-issue 
sample to one firm observation per issue date if there is at least one bond with a make-whole 
provision issued on that date. To insure that our results specifically relate to make-whole call 
provisions, we exclude observations if one or more fixed-price callable bonds were also issued on 
the same date. The resulting sample of make-whole call issues has a maximum of 2,928 firm-level 
observations. To reduce the influence of firm-level clustering on the results, we employ the J-Test 
jtV
mtV
j
j
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statistic proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) to assess the significance of single-day and 
cumulative event period abnormal CARV. The J-Test modifies the standardized cross-sectional test 
(Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen, 1991) to take cross-correlation into account. In addition, we 
also report the nonparametric generalized rank statistic proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) 
which may be more appropriate if there are non-normalities in the distribution of the trading 
volume measure.  
Table 11 presents the single- and multi-day abnormal volume results. We begin with a 
baseline effect in Panel A that utilizes the full sample of make-whole callable issue observations. 
Consistent with the premise that make-whole callable bond issuance releases information that 
stimulates trading, Panel A illustrates that abnormal volume increases significantly around the 
issue date. However, there are differing effects when managerial incentives are higher and lower. 
In Panel B, mean abnormal volume on day-zero is 3.43 percent for issuers in the highest CEO delta 
tercile while the cumulated two-day effect is 6.70 percent. In contrast, and in support of the 
intuition that lower delta provokes greater divergence in investors’ opinions about the motivation 
for the use of the make-whole call provision and greater uncertainty about the likelihood of future 
events for which flexibility is useful, Panel C demonstrates the abnormal volume for issuers in the 
lowest tercile increases more than two-fold, where the day-zero effect is 7.44 percent and the 
cumulated two-day effect is approximately 16.14 percent. Finally, Panel D illustrates the two-day 
cumulated CARV in Panels B-C are significantly different at the five (10) percent level using the 
standard t-statistic (Wilcoxon Z-statistic), respectively.  
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6. Conclusions 
 Motivated by the view that make-whole call provisions provide a mechanism for 
facilitating greater financial flexibility, we hypothesize that greater incentive alignment between 
shareholders and managers incentivizes the use of the make-whole call provision in corporate debt 
securities. Our conjecture that equity incentives motivate the use of make-whole call provisions 
finds strong support in the data. Consistent with the findings of prior research demonstrating that 
make-whole callable bonds are associated with subsequent debt retirements related to shareholder 
wealth-enhancing precautionary refinancing and M&A transactions, our multinomial logit 
analyses document a strong positive association between managerial equity incentives and make-
whole provisions. Consistent with the view that the link between managerial incentives and issuance 
of make-whole callable is affected by financial distress, our results document a diminished association 
between equity incentives and the use of make-whole calls for lower credit quality issuers. Further, 
and consistent with the view that there is greater potential value creation from financial flexibility 
when growth opportunities are greater, this relation is strongest for issuers with higher growth 
prospects. This result is robust to endogeneity concerns. Building on these findings, a propensity 
score matching approach demonstrates that make-whole call issuance is followed by significantly 
better performance relative to a matched set of control firms and the effect is strongest for higher 
managerial equity incentive issuers.  
Following the view that financial flexibility associated with the make-whole call provision 
imposes potential costs on bondholders, prior research demonstrates that make-whole call 
provisions are associated with a small yet positive premium on newly issued corporate debt. We 
extend these findings by demonstrating that managerial equity incentives impact the incremental 
make-whole effect on yield spreads: when equity incentives are high (low), the premium is greater 
(lesser). Finally, in support of the view that higher equity incentives provide a clearer indication 
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to market participants of the underlying motivation for a make-whole provision, abnormal relative 
trading volume is decreasing in equity incentives. Overall, these results collectively support the 
notion that managerial incentives play a financial flexibility-linked role in the use and pricing of 
corporate debt characteristics. 
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Endnotes 
1 While infrequent, there are instances of dramatic credit quality improvement resulting from extreme market 
conditions that allow for advantageous make-whole call exercise. For example, Kolotay (2010) points to the following 
example: “In April 2009 Verizon issued 6.35% bonds maturing in 2019 at a whopping 387 basis bps spread to the 10-
year Treasury. The make-whole call at T+75 bps appeared innocuous at the time. But after the credit crisis abated and 
Verizon’s spreads tightened considerably, it is conceivable that the bonds will be called below fair value.” 
2 A contrary opinion is expressed by Nayar and Stock (2008), who argue that a make-whole call provision is a more 
efficient mechanism for a manager with positive private information to signal that information to the market because 
the call premium no longer compensates for an interest rate option. However, this argument ignores the infrequency 
with which make-whole calls are exercised in-the-money. 
3 We thank our reviewer for suggesting these possibilities. 
4 See https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/08/make-whole-premium-is-unmatured-interest for more detail. 
5 We use the “deltavega_2013” SAS code provided by Lalitha Naveen to calculate CEO and top management 
incentives (https://astro.temple.edu/~lnaveen/ documents/deltavega_2013.sas). 
6 We use Stata’s margins command to obtain marginal effects. 
7 These ten regions are based on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_regions_of_the_United_States. 
8 We conduct the PSM procedure with the PSMATCH2 Stata command.  
9 FRED provides daily yields to maturity for constant maturity Treasury bond indices including 3-month, 6-month, 1-
year, 2-year, 3-year, 5-year, 7-year, 10-year, and 20-year maturities. We interpolate these indices to obtain a yield 
curve for any maturity between 3 months and 20 years.  
10 We generate issue date daily and cumulated abnormal trading volume with the Eventus software package written 
by Arnie Cowan. 
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Appendix 
Description of Variables Used in the Study 
 
Variable Name  Description and Source 
Panel A: Bond-level variables 
Time to maturity 
 
Fractional number of years to final maturity. Source of inputs: Final maturity (SDC) or maturity (FISD 
Issues) 
 
Offering amount 
Principal issued on the issue date: Source of inputs: Principal amount (SDC) or offering_amt (FISD 
Issues) 
 Rule 144a 
Dummy variable equal to one if the bond is issued under SEC Rule 144a. Source of inputs: Rule 144A 
(SDC) or parsed from issue_name (FISD Issues) 
Yield spread 
The bond YTM (calculated using inputs provided by SDC or FISD) minus the interpolated monthly 
Treasury bond yield. Source: SDC Platinum or FISD Issues (at-issue bond prices), St. Louis Federal 
Reserve (Treasury Note and Bond yields) 
Moody’s bond rating Moody rating (SDC) or rating_type=’MR’ (FISD Issues) 
Modified duration First derivative of the price-yield function, divided by price. Source of inputs: SDC or FISD Issues. 
Subordinate 
Dummy variable equal to one if the bond is subordinated. Source of inputs: Parsed from security_type (SDC) 
or security_level=’SUB’ (FISD Issues).  
Putable 
Dummy variable equal to one if the bond contains embedded put provisions. Source of inputs: Put features = 
‘Putable’ (SDC) or putable=’Y’ (FISD Issues).  
Panel B: Firm-level variables 
Panel B1: Equity Incentives 
CEO Delta (or Delta) 
Sensitivity of CEO incentives (previously granted exercisable and unexercisable options plus current 
option awards plus equity grants) to a 1% change in stock price, using the method of Core and Guay 
(2002). Source: ExecuComp. 
Top management delta Aggregate delta of all executives for a firm. Source: ExecuComp. 
Panel B2: Control Variables  
Granularity 
Capital structure granularity using the method (“GRAN1”) of Choi, Hackbarth and Zechner (2017). 
Source of inputs: SDC Platinum or FISD Issues. 
Stock -Treasury corr. 
Correlation between weekly stock return and the weekly 10-year Treasury spot rate measured over two 
years prior to the issue date. Source: CRSP (returns), FRED (weekly Treasury rates). 
Market-book ratio 
Total liabilities plus market capitalization of equity divided by total assets (AT-CEQ + (PRCCF×CSHO) 
/ AT). Source: Compustat 
Sales growth Five-year geometric growth in sales ending on the year of the issue. Source: Compustat 
Firm size Logged sum of market capitalization (PRCCF×CSHO). Source: Compustat 
Liquidity Cash (CHE) divided by total assets (AT). Source: Compustat. 
Delaware Dummy variable equal to one if INCORP = ‘DE’. Source: Compustat. 
Leverage Long term debt (DLTT) divided by total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
ROA Net income (NI) divided by total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
Std. ROA Standard deviation of ROA for the prior 5 years. Source: Compustat 
 
 
Tangibility Property, plant and equipment (PPENT) divided by total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
Risk-adjusted stock return 
Cumulated one-year abnormal return ending the month prior to the issue date using a single market model 
and the CRSP value-weighted index. Source: CRSP 
Analyst coverage Logged Number of analysts following the issuer’s stock (NUMEST). Source: IBES  
Industry fixed effects 
 
Industry classifications based on 30 industry definitions. Source: Kenneth R French Data Library 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html) 
 
 
Panel B3: Additional Control Variables Used in Yield Spread Analysis 
Negative net income Binary variable equal to 1 if net income (NI) is negative. Source: Compustat 
Industry concentration Herfindahl Hirschman Index for the issuer’s 3-digit SIC code, calculated as ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , where si is the 
proportion of sales of firm I in the issuer’s 3-digit SIC industry and N is the number of firms in the 
industry. Source: Compustat 
 Panel C: Market-level Interest Rate Variables 
Yield curve slope 10-year Treasury rate minus the 6-month Treasury date on the bond offering date. Source: FRED  
10-year Treasury rate 10-year Treasury rate on the bond offering date. Source: FRED 
Std. (10-year Treasury rate) Standard deviation of the monthly 10-year Treasury rate for the prior six months. Source: FRED 
Baa-Aaa spread Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield minus the Aaa Corporate Bond Yield. Source: FRED 
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Figure 1 
Proportions of Fixed Price Callable, Make-Whole Callable, and Straight Debt Issuance by 
Year 
Figure 1 illustrates the proportions of make-whole callable (MWC), fixed price callable (FPC), and straight debt by year 
over the 1995-2017 period in our primary sample of 7,657 at-issue observations.  
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Table 1 
Sample Selection Criteria 
 
Selection Criteria No. Obs. 
SDC (1980-2017) and FISD (1950-2017) non-convertible, fixed rate, at-issue corporate bonds 
Less: Offering year < 1995, maturity < 3 years, Offering amount < $10 million 
330,734 
(109,543) 
Less: Utilities (4900 ≤ SIC ≤ 4999) and financials (6000 ≤ SIC ≤ 6999)  (188,287) 
 32,904 
Less: Missing additional firm characteristics obtained from Execucomp. CRSP, Compustat, and IBES 
used in multinomial logit analysis  
(25,247) 
 
Sample of MWC, FPC, and straight bonds used in multinomial logit analysis (Table 2 Panels A-B) 7,657 
Less: Missing Moody’s rating  (433) 
Less: Missing additional bond- and firm characteristics used in yield spread analysis (998) 
Sample of MWC, FPC, and straight bonds used in yield spread analysis (Table 2 Panel C) 6,266 
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Table 2  
Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Call Provision Choice and  
Yield Spread Models 
Bond-level variables (No. Obs. = 7,657)      
Panel A1: Embedded call provisions  Mean Std. Dev. Q25 Median Q75 
Make-whole callable 0.498     
Make-whole callable with fixed price at end 0.096     
Make-whole callable (total) 0.594     
Fixed price callable immediately 0.002     
Fixed price callable with call protection 0.135     
Fixed-price callable with make-whole call protection  0.060     
Fixed price callable (total) 0.197     
Non-callable 0.196     
Panel A2: Bond-level characteristics used in the multinomial logit analyses   
Time to maturity (years)  11.005 9.024 6.016 9.970 10.058 
Offering amount (unadjusted $MM) 979 1,951 250 500 1000 
Rule 144a 0.176 0.380 0 0 0 
Panel B1: Managerial equity incentives ($000’s)       
Top management delta (No. Obs. = 7,657) 4238 29277 454 1075 2363 
CEO delta (No. Obs. = 7,456) 2425 20383 197 503 1173 
Panel B2: Firm-level control variables (No. Obs. = 7,657)     
Granularity 3.123 1.578 1.988 2.880 3.987 
Stock–Treasury corr. 0.136 0.162 0.025 0.138 0.242 
Market-book ratio 1.849 0.881 1.262 1.588 2.148 
Sales growth  0.073 0.110 0.014 0.051 0.107 
Log (Firm size) 9.676 1.615 8.516 9.642 10.807 
Liquidity 0.086 0.104 0.018 0.048 0.112 
Delaware 0.636 0.481 0 1 1 
Leverage 0.344 0.154 0.237 0.322 0.430 
Profitability 0.051 0.072 0.024 0.052 0.084 
Std. ( Profitability) 0.035 0.048 0.012 0.021 0.039 
Tangibility 0.343 0.519 0.123 0.261 0.506 
Risk-adjusted stock return 0.038 0.371 -0.153 0.023 0.213 
Analyst coverage 3.869 3.162 1 3 6 
Panel C: Additional bond- and firm-level variables used in yield spread models (No. Obs. = 6,266) 
Yield spread 0.020 0.018 0.008 0.014 0.027 
Moody’s bond rating  13.356 3.561 12 (Baa3) 14 (Baa1) 16 (A2) 
Modified duration  7.376 3.326 4.849 6.987 8.292 
Subordinate  0.042 0.201 0 0 0 
Putable  0.008 0.090 0 0 0 
Negative net income 0.108 0.310 0 0 0 
Industry concentration 0.176 0.162 0.072 0.133 0.221 
Panel D: Market-level control variables      
Yield curve slope 0.017 0.010 0.009 0.018 0.025 
10-year Treasury rate 0.037 0.015 0.023 0.036 0.048 
Std. (10-year Treasury rate) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 
Baa-Aaa index spread 0.010 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.012 
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Table 3 
Differences in Means of Selected Variables 
In Table 3 Panel A, the subset comparisons are based on a total of 7,657 observations indicated in Table 2 Panels B1-
B2 and are comprised of 1,507 straight bond issues, 4,552 make-whole callable issues, and 1,505 fixed-price callable 
issues. In Panel B, the comparisons are based on the 6,266 observations indicated in Table 2 Panel C. 
 
Panel A: Comparisons of firm-level characteristics used in the multinomial logit analyses  
 Straight 
bonds 
MWC 
bonds 
Difference  
(MWC vs. Straight) 
FPC 
bonds 
Difference 
(FPC vs. Straight) 
CEO delta ($M) 1,441 3,214 -1,774*** 1,028 413 
Top management delta ($M) 2,501 5,771 -3,271*** 1,662 838** 
Granularity 3.548 3.136 0.411*** 2.644 0.904*** 
Stock-Treasury Corr. 0.073 0.159 -0.085*** 0.137 -0.064*** 
Market-book ratio 1.945 1.909 0.036 1.558 0.387*** 
Sales growth 0.071 0.060 0.011*** 0.105 -0.034*** 
Log (Firm size) 9.484 10.149 -0.665*** 8.510 0.974*** 
Liquidity 0.062 0.096 -0.034*** 0.077 -0.015*** 
Delaware 0.570 0.633 -0.063*** 0.733 -0.163*** 
Leverage 0.333 0.321 0.013*** 0.422 -0.089*** 
ROA 0.060 0.058 0.002 0.019 0.041*** 
Std. (ROA) 0.026 0.032 -0.007*** 0.054 -0.029*** 
Tangibility 0.416 0.312 0.105*** 0.359 0.057** 
Risk-adjusted stock return 0.021 0.027 -0.007 0.095 -0.075*** 
Analyst coverage 2.786 4.610 -1.824*** 2.806 -0.020 
 
Panel B: Comparisons of additional bond- and firm-level characteristics used in the yield spread analysis 
 Straight 
bonds 
MWC 
bonds 
Difference  
(MWC vs. Straight) 
FPC 
bonds 
Difference 
(FPC vs. Straight) 
Yield spread 0.013 0.018 -0.006*** 0.035 -0.023*** 
Moody’s rating 14.565 13.855 0.710*** 9.452 5.114*** 
Modified duration 6.229 7.825 -1.596*** 6.917 -0.688*** 
Subordinate 0.023 0.010 0.013*** 0.211 -0.187*** 
Putable 0.015 0.001 0.014*** 0.029 -0.013** 
Negative net income 0.067 0.090 -0.023** 0.243 -0.177*** 
Industry concentration 0.185 0.176 0.009* 0.164 0.021*** 
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Table 4 
Correlation Matrix  
Table 4 provides Pearson pair-wise correlation coefficients for the firm-level measures provided in Table 2 Panels B1-B2. * and ** denote significance at the 5 
percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 Log 
(Delta) 
Granularity 
Stock-Treasury 
Corr. 
Market-
book ratio 
Sales 
growth 
Firm size Liquidity Delaware Leverage ROA 
Std. 
ROA 
Tangibility 
Risk-adjusted 
stock return 
Log (Delta) 1             
Granularity 0.150** 1            
Stock-Treasury Corr. -0.050** -0.112** 1           
Market-book ratio 0.324** 0.033** -0.129** 1          
Sales growth 0.103** -0.110** -0.115** -0.006 1         
Firm size 0.491** 0.385** 0.020 0.346** -0.145** 1        
Liquidity 0.076** -0.015 0.095** 0.276** -0.071** 0.182** 1       
Delaware -0.002 -0.068** 0.051** -0.020 0.068** -0.041** 0.031** 1      
Leverage -0.156** 0.036** -0.124** -0.018 0.048** -0.227** -0.123** 0.024* 1     
ROA 0.276** 0.028* -0.024* 0.486** -0.003 0.289** 0.137** -0.065** -0.204** 1    
Std. ROA -0.206** -0.073** 0.059** -0.048** -0.042** -0.192** 0.116** 0.061** 0.230** -0.288** 1   
Tangibility 0.009 0.050** -0.003 -0.065** 0.026* -0.022* -0.065** 0.015 0.023* -0.092** 0.022 1  
Risk-adjusted stock return 0.073** -0.019 -0.022* 0.059** 0.066** -0.016 -0.023* 0.020 0.082** 0.045** 0.050** -0.020 1 
Analyst coverage 0.232** 0.082** 0.230** 0.143** -0.096** 0.513** 0.222** 0.045** -0.133** 0.107** -0.009 -0.017 -0.012 
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Table 5 
Managerial Equity Incentives and Call Provision Choice in Newly Issued Bonds: 
Multinomial Logit Estimates 
Table 5 provides maximum-likelihood multinomial logit estimates using three levels of call protection as discrete outcomes on 
managerial equity incentives and other explanatory variables. The robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm 
level. P-values are provided in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
 
 CEO Delta Top Management Delta Lagged CEO Delta Lagged Top Management Delta 
 MWC 
Category 
FPC 
Category 
MWC 
Category 
FPC 
Category 
MWC 
Category 
FPC 
Category 
MWC 
Category 
FPC  
Category 
Log (Delta) 0.143** 0.036 0.157** 0.042 0.112* -0.039 0.141** -0.032 
 (0.023) (0.645) (0.022) (0.630) (0.053) (0.581) (0.029) (0.687) 
Log (Time to maturity) 1.154*** 1.157*** 1.135*** 1.134*** 1.132*** 1.146*** 1.122*** 1.108*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (Offering amount) 0.793*** 0.199 0.783*** 0.176 0.779*** 0.195 0.786*** 0.208 
 (0.000) (0.411) (0.000) (0.445) (0.000) (0.422) (0.000) (0.386) 
Rule 144A -0.522*** 0.377*** -0.457*** 0.398*** -0.507*** 0.377*** -0.484*** 0.405*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) 
Granularity -0.136*** -0.095 -0.139*** -0.108* -0.128*** -0.072 -0.139*** -0.090 
 (0.003) (0.109) (0.002) (0.091) (0.004) (0.208) (0.001) (0.144) 
Stock-Treasury Corr. 0.466 0.949* 0.353 0.838* 0.349 0.786 0.405 0.867* 
 (0.326) (0.063) (0.453) (0.098) (0.478) (0.138) (0.405) (0.097) 
Market-book ratio -0.025 -0.262* -0.004 -0.255* -0.035 -0.280** -0.003 -0.245* 
 (0.793) (0.053) (0.969) (0.053) (0.715) (0.030) (0.976) (0.057) 
Sales growth -0.134 2.722*** -0.110 2.825*** -0.172 2.818*** -0.149 2.853*** 
 (0.848) (0.000) (0.873) (0.000) (0.814) (0.000) (0.833) (0.000) 
Firm size -0.158 -0.466** -0.169* -0.468** -0.157 -0.457** -0.164 -0.455** 
 (0.133) (0.016) (0.093) (0.013) (0.137) (0.016) (0.110) (0.015) 
Liquidity -0.158 0.701 -0.592 0.065 -0.018 0.886 -0.560 0.057 
 (0.832) (0.413) (0.418) (0.943) (0.981) (0.288) (0.448) (0.949) 
Delaware 0.054 0.580*** 0.085 0.560*** 0.049 0.573*** 0.079 0.566*** 
 (0.744) (0.001) (0.597) (0.001) (0.773) (0.002) (0.634) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.517 2.249*** -0.509 2.199*** -0.416 2.263*** -0.470 2.070*** 
 (0.399) (0.000) (0.395) (0.000) (0.516) (0.000) (0.445) (0.000) 
ROA -3.207* -4.713*** -3.667** -4.805*** -2.917* -4.034** -3.571** -4.569*** 
 (0.054) (0.004) (0.029) (0.004) (0.077) (0.013) (0.036) (0.006) 
Std. ROA 5.463** 8.702*** 5.773** 9.582*** 4.391* 8.124*** 4.945** 8.858*** 
 (0.028) (0.001) (0.021) (0.000) (0.084) (0.003) (0.043) (0.001) 
Tangibility -0.176 0.062 -0.172 0.065 -0.212 0.066 -0.169 0.073 
 (0.367) (0.345) (0.392) (0.311) (0.343) (0.301) (0.398) (0.248) 
Risk-adjusted stock return -0.069 0.226 -0.048 0.210 -0.070 0.199 -0.024 0.228 
 (0.597) (0.102) (0.712) (0.128) (0.614) (0.168) (0.859) (0.103) 
Analyst coverage 0.177 -0.156 0.200* -0.141 0.227* -0.103 0.204* -0.117 
 (0.131) (0.239) (0.080) (0.265) (0.059) (0.446) (0.078) (0.367) 
Yield curve slope -18.425* -16.597 -17.776* -15.876 -14.839 -15.269 -17.553* -16.577 
 (0.086) (0.139) (0.093) (0.145) (0.164) (0.178) (0.098) (0.127) 
10-year Treasury rate 3.052 18.525 1.464 14.905 -0.425 10.421 1.607 13.525 
 (0.848) (0.250) (0.926) (0.346) (0.980) (0.535) (0.920) (0.401) 
Std. (10-year Treasury rate) -2.896 25.676 -9.432 17.602 -19.214 18.373 -12.505 20.078 
 (0.946) (0.621) (0.823) (0.733) (0.658) (0.734) (0.768) (0.701) 
Baa-Aaa spread 9.661 -15.271 6.486 -17.705 11.952 -19.208 7.328 -19.520 
 (0.711) (0.587) (0.799) (0.521) (0.655) (0.500) (0.777) (0.484) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 7,456 7,456 7,657 7,657 7,183 7,183 7,439 7,439 
Pseudo R-squared 0.290  0.290  0.287  0.291  
Wald Chi-squared 5566.24  5436.77  5305.37  5607.21  
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Table 6 
Managerial Equity Incentives and Call Provision Choice in Newly Issued Bonds:  
Instrumental Variable Probit Models 
Table 6 reports instrumental variable (IV) probit estimates of the association between managerial equity incentives and 
the choice to use a make-whole call (MWC) provision in newly issued bond issues using an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach. The binary response variable in Models 1-2 equals one if the issue is make-whole callable and zero if the bond 
does not contain any call provisions. The robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. P-values are 
provided in parentheses. ***, **, and * correspond to significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
  Model (1) Model (2) 
Panel B: First Stage Estimates Delta = CEO Delta Delta = Top Management Delta 
Log (Number of Standard Federal Region public companies) 0.067** 0.064** 
 (0.019) (0.029) 
Log (Mean state pay-performance sensitivity) 0.195*** 0.217*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (CEO tenure) 0.662*** 0.365*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Additional first stage regressors Yes Yes 
Panel C: Second Stage Estimates  
Log (Delta) IV 0.090** 0.121** 
 (0.014) (0.044) 
Additional control variables Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 4,863 4,933 
Wald Chi-square 1,051.38 1,050.05 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) 
Wald test of exogeneity Chi-square statistic 2.29 0.01 
(p-value) (0.130) (0.926) 
Anderson LR statistic (IV identification / IV relevance test)  1,559.225 713.967 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen J over-identification test Chi-square statistic 1.532 0.612 
(p-value) (0.465) (0.736) 
Panel A: Instrument Summary Statistics  Mean Std. Dev. Q25 Median Q75 
Number of Standard Federal Region public companies 1,155 450.78 1000 1,125 1,352 
Mean state pay-performance sensitivity ($000’s) 1,452 4,812 444 707 1,342 
CEO tenure (years) 6.356 6.094 2 5 9 
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Table 7 
Managerial Equity Incentives and Call Provision Choice in Newly Issued Bonds: 
Credit Rating Subsets 
Table 7 provides maximum-likelihood multinomial logit estimates using three levels of call protection as discrete outcomes on 
managerial equity incentives and other explanatory variables. For brevity, we report results using the CEO delta. The subsets 
are segmented around the ‘B+’ S&P Firm Quality Rating and, alternatively, investment grade and high yield Moody’s bond 
ratings. The robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. P-values are provided in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 S&P Firm Quality Ranking ≥ B+ S&P Firm Quality Ranking ≤ B Moody’s Rating ≥ Baa3 Moody’s Rating ≤  Ba1 
 MWC 
Category 
FPC  
Category 
MWC 
Category 
FPC  
Category 
MWC 
Category 
FPC 
Category 
MWC 
Category 
FPC  
Category 
Log (CEO delta) 0.187** 0.139 0.088 -0.057 0.159** 0.122 0.136 -0.021 
 (0.039) (0.216) (0.257) (0.451) (0.029) (0.183) (0.244) (0.842) 
Log (Time to maturity) 1.374*** 1.331*** 0.758*** 0.860*** 1.163*** 1.214*** 0.857** 1.093** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.010) 
Log (offering amount) 0.830*** -0.179 0.901*** 0.797*** 0.867*** -0.268* 0.377** 0.486** 
 (0.000) (0.384) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.049) (0.011) 
Rule 144A -0.566** 0.771*** -0.543*** 0.142 -0.154 0.424 -1.428*** -1.013*** 
 (0.015) (0.000) (0.001) (0.417) (0.458) (0.139) (0.000) (0.000) 
Granularity -0.098* -0.140* -0.182*** -0.069 -0.145*** -0.235*** -0.139 0.028 
 (0.099) (0.054) (0.007) (0.412) (0.003) (0.001) (0.178) (0.738) 
Stock-Treasury Corr. 0.766 0.080 0.264 1.324* 0.355 0.054 0.711 1.795** 
 (0.204) (0.913) (0.688) (0.075) (0.515) (0.957) (0.473) (0.043) 
Market-book ratio -0.018 -0.234 -0.176 -0.299 -0.054 -0.083 0.181 0.083 
 (0.883) (0.145) (0.273) (0.137) (0.587) (0.502) (0.511) (0.750) 
Sales growth -0.624 2.748*** 0.752 3.187*** 0.333 -1.895 -1.553* 1.795** 
 (0.578) (0.005) (0.382) (0.001) (0.739) (0.152) (0.087) (0.040) 
Firm size -0.253* -0.219 -0.081 -0.771*** -0.191 0.307** 0.019 -0.829*** 
 (0.082) (0.259) (0.492) (0.000) (0.110) (0.029) (0.905) (0.000) 
Liquidity -1.156 -0.096 2.170 2.276 -0.323 1.116 -0.127 0.516 
 (0.219) (0.926) (0.144) (0.150) (0.686) (0.253) (0.939) (0.745) 
Delaware 0.042 0.870*** 0.005 0.231 0.095 0.909*** -0.517** -0.039 
 (0.851) (0.000) (0.982) (0.315) (0.624) (0.000) (0.047) (0.869) 
Leverage 0.317 3.021*** -1.368* 1.647** -0.397 1.251* -1.568** 0.022 
 (0.620) (0.000) (0.092) (0.029) (0.604) (0.097) (0.036) (0.972) 
ROA -0.696 -3.945 -4.514** -4.481** -3.100 -5.440** -1.736 -1.572 
 (0.779) (0.148) (0.022) (0.018) (0.151) (0.019) (0.331) (0.312) 
Std. ROA 9.794** 14.921*** 2.894 4.538 11.017*** 16.887*** -1.254 0.302 
 (0.018) (0.000) (0.295) (0.106) (0.000) (0.000) (0.519) (0.842) 
Tangibility -0.111 0.028 -0.192 0.235 -0.190 -0.050 1.017** 0.992* 
 (0.603) (0.677) (0.661) (0.624) (0.461) (0.475) (0.031) (0.054) 
Risk-adjusted stock return 0.032 0.268 -0.086 0.158 -0.020 0.507* -0.073 0.049 
 (0.862) (0.271) (0.610) (0.335) (0.909) (0.064) (0.733) (0.777) 
Analyst coverage 0.256* -0.150 0.093 -0.160 0.116 -0.271 0.297 -0.028 
 (0.087) (0.418) (0.565) (0.354) (0.401) (0.181) (0.192) (0.894) 
Yield curve slope -26.802* -19.705 1.677 -7.279 -18.177 -42.843*** 2.314 7.430 
 (0.059) (0.159) (0.912) (0.638) (0.126) (0.006) (0.896) (0.666) 
10-year Treasury rate 17.505 -5.740 -16.882 21.580 2.575 40.058* -28.110 -29.789 
 (0.422) (0.792) (0.423) (0.383) (0.889) (0.099) (0.317) (0.292) 
Std. (10-year Treasury rate) 21.998 -2.610 -26.640 62.656 -6.500 -35.261 47.062 201.718** 
 (0.696) (0.975) (0.688) (0.381) (0.891) (0.725) (0.639) (0.036) 
Baa-Aaa spread -5.858 -35.123 69.661** 49.635 11.737 -19.561 30.104 12.844 
 (0.865) (0.326) (0.044) (0.247) (0.684) (0.656) (0.615) (0.833) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 4,287 4,287 3,169 3,169 5,435 5,435 2,021 2,021 
Pseudo R-squared 0.317  0.271  0.291  0.208  
Wald Chi-squared 3064.69  5201.31  4012.46  11742.81  
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Table 8 
Growth Prospects and the Effect of CEO Equity Incentives on Make-Whole Provision Choice  
Table 8 reports estimates of the association between managerial equity incentives and the choice to use the make-whole call 
provision within growth-based subsets using the multinomial logit methodology. We adjust the standard errors for clustering 
at the firm level. P-values are provided in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 Delta = CEO Delta Delta = Top Management Delta 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Log (Delta) 0.102 0.101 0.117 0.102 
 (0.123) (0.144) (0.104) (0.171) 
Log(Delta) * HSG-HMB 0.395***  0.372***  
 (0.000)  (0.003)  
HSG-HMB -4.014***  -2.982***  
 (0.000)  (0.001)  
Log(Delta) * Industry-adj. HSG-HMB  0.244**  0.299*** 
  (0.018)  (0.009) 
Industry-adj. HSG-HMB  -1.795**  -2.364*** 
  (0.012)  (0.004) 
Additional control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 7,456 7,456 7,657 7,657 
Pseudo R-squared 0.292 0.291 0.292 0.292 
5385.94 Wald Chi-squared 5532.27 5596.53 5485.92 
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Table 9 
Post-Issue Performance for Make-whole Callable Bond Issuers:  
Propensity Score Matching 
Table 9 provides the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) of make-whole callable bond issuers using one-
to-one and one-to-five nearest-neighbor matching. There are 2,174 treated firm-year make-whole call issuers with 
non-missing CEO delta. Treated firms issue at least one make-whole callable bond and no fixed price callable bonds 
in a given year.  
 
 
Panel A: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (Outcome variable = ROAt+1) 
 Treated Controls Difference Std. Error T-stat 
Panel A1: One-to-one Matching  
Full Sample 0.0557 0.0189 0.0367 0.0159 2.31 
Top tercile CEO delta 0.0737 0.0541 0.0196 0.0072 2.69 
Bottom tercile CEO delta 0.0322 0.0313 0.0009 0.0086 0.10 
Panel A2: One-to-five Matching  
Full Sample 0.0557 0.0273 0.0284 0.0081 3.50 
Top tercile CEO delta 0.0737 0.0359 0.0377 0.0177 2.13 
Bottom tercile CEO delta 0.0322 0.0366 -0.0044 0.0044 -1.00 
 
 
Panel B: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (Outcome variable = ROAt+2) 
Panel B1: One-to-one Matching     
Full Sample 0.0528 0.0151 0.0377 0.0272 1.38 
Top tercile CEO delta 0.0684 0.0456 0.0227 0.0083 2.75 
Bottom tercile CEO delta 0.0327 0.0366 -0.0039 0.0069 -0.57 
Panel B2: One-to-five Matching  
Full Sample 0.0528 0.0312 0.0216 0.0079 2.72 
Top tercile CEO delta 0.0684 0.0531 0.0153 0.0054 2.84 
Bottom tercile CEO delta 0.0327 0.0228 0.0098 0.0067 1.46 
 
 
 Panel C: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (Outcome variable = Sales Growtht, t+2) 
Panel C1: One-to-one Matching     
Full Sample 0.0531 0.0654 -0.0121 0.0080 -1.53 
Top tercile CEO delta 0.0770 0.0509 0.0160 0.0101 1.59 
Bottom tercile CEO delta 0.0415 0.0817 -0.0402 0.0155 -2.59 
Panel C2: One-to-five Matching 
Full Sample 0.0531 0.0641 -0.0355 0.0102 -3.47 
Top tercile CEO delta 0.0770 0.0537 0.0133 0.0067 1.97 
Bottom tercile CEO delta 0.0415 0.0778 -0.0363 0.0089 -4.07 
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Table 10 
Managerial Equity Incentives and Call Provisions: At-Issue Bond Yield Spreads  
Table 10 reports least squares coefficient estimates of at-issue yield spreads regressed on indicators for make-whole (MWC) and 
fixed price callable (FPC) bonds and other bond- and firm-level explanatory variables using a maximum of 6,015 bond-year 
observations. We measure equity incentives at the CEO and top management levels. The final row displays the p-value for the 
difference in MWC estimates for top vs. bottom Delta terciles. P-values based on robust cluster-adjusted standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 Delta = CEO Delta Delta = Top Management Delta 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
MWC 0.0010 -0.0000 0.0011 -0.0002 
 (0.252) (0.980) (0.228) (0.848) 
MWC * Top third delta  0.0031**  0.0035*** 
  (0.023)  (0.007) 
Top third delta -0.0010*** -0.0032*** -0.0010** -0.0034*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.028) (0.003) 
Residual bond rating -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FPC 0.0065*** 0.0063*** 0.0067*** 0.0065*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (offering amount) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.622) (0.553) (0.606) (0.555) 
Duration 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.230) (0.242) (0.249) (0.258) 
Subordinate 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 
 (0.629) (0.621) (0.615) (0.641) 
Rule 144a 0.0092*** 0.0091*** 0.0092*** 0.0091*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Putable -0.0113*** -0.0113*** -0.0111*** -0.0110*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Liquidity 0.0084** 0.0087** 0.0084** 0.0087*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) 
Firm size -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.0160*** 0.0159*** 0.0158*** 0.0157*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-book ratio -0.0019*** -0.0018*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales growth 0.0077*** 0.0078*** 0.0068*** 0.0070*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005) 
ROA -0.0185*** -0.0188*** -0.0179*** -0.0183*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Std. ROA 0.0407*** 0.0403*** 0.0403*** 0.0399*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Negative net income 0.0078*** 0.0079*** 0.0078*** 0.0078*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangibility -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.674) (0.813) (0.695) (0.826) 
Analyst coverage -0.0009* -0.0009* -0.0009* -0.0009* 
 (0.089) (0.083) (0.070) (0.075) 
Industry concentration 0.0028 0.0029 0.0029 0.0030 
 (0.133) (0.114) (0.119) (0.107) 
Yield curve slope 0.1176 0.1174 0.1147 0.1151 
 (0.107) (0.111) (0.119) (0.115) 
10-year Treasury rate -0.1927** -0.1915** -0.2060** -0.2021** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.012) 
Std. (10-year Treasury rate) 0.0979 0.1040 0.1126 0.1133 
 (0.737) (0.718) (0.701) (0.693) 
Baa-Aaa spread 1.1444*** 1.1385*** 1.1591*** 1.1563*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. Obs. 6,135 6,135 6,266 6,266 
R-squared 0.723 0.724 0.725 0.727 
F-statistic 114.5 113.6 120.3 119.6 
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Table 11 
Managerial Equity Incentives and Make-Whole Callable Bond Issuance:  
Abnormal Trading Volume 
Table 11 presents mean daily and cumulative abnormal relative volume (CARV) for make-whole callable bond 
issuance over the 1995-2017 sample period. The first column identifies the event window where day 0 is the bond 
issue date. Mean CARV is measured using an equally-weighted market model approach estimated over day -225 to 
day -2. The standardized cross-sectional z-statistic (generalized rank t-statistic) tests for the significance of each event 
day or window using a two-tail test, respectively. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample of MWC Issue Dates   
Event Window No. Obs. Mean CARV (%)  J-Test Z-statistic Generalized Rank T-statistic 
-1 2,926 4.98 2.277** 2.270** 
0 2,927 6.07 2.771*** 2.672*** 
[-1,0] 2,928 11.04 2.827*** 2.762*** 
Panel B: Top Tercile CEO Delta    
-1 998 3.28 1.709* 1.845* 
0 998 3.43 1.596 1.517 
[-1,0] 999 6.70 1.843* 1.950* 
Panel C: Bottom Tercile CEO Delta    
-1 1,004 7.44 2.656*** 2.470** 
0 1,005 8.70 3.129*** 2.970*** 
[-1,0] 1,005 16.14 3.249*** 2.999*** 
 
Panel D: Significance of Bottom Tercile vs. Top Tercile [-1, 0] Mean CARV 
  Bottom-Top (%) T-statistic 
(p-value) 
Wilcoxon Z-statistic 
(p-value) 
 9.43 2.38 
(0.017) 
1.814 
(0.070) 
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Response to Reviewer 
(JBFA-08-19-07014) 
 
“Top Management Incentives and Financial Flexibility: The Case of Make-Whole Call Provisions” 
 
At the outset, we would like to thank the reviewer for their detailed and thoughtful review. We hope to have addressed 
these comments in the revised manuscript. Our replies to each (italicized) comment are as follows: 
 
 Major Comments  
 
1. Channel for the connection between MWC and equity incentives. I think that a connection between the two is 
intuitive, but the author(s) need to be careful about how the argument is being made. Currently, the write-up 
identifies two potential channels:  
• MWC creates flexibility → flexibility is more valuable when the quality of managerial decisions is higher → the 
quality of managerial decisions is higher when incentives are aligned.  
• MWC creates flexibility → flexibility is valuable for the firm → properly incentivized managers are more likely to 
choose valuable options for the firm  
 
Both of the channels above would drive an association between MWC and equity incentives, but the test of each 
would involve different timing of the variables. A test using contemporaneous left- and right-hand variables (like the 
current write-up presents) is more in line with the first channel, while the second channel would imply that the 
explanatory variables are lagged (i.e. if the manager’s incentives are aligned at t-1, they are likely to choose MWC 
at t).  
 
The point is well taken. To incorporate the second channel into the motivation for Hypothesis 1, we have modified 
the discussion leading up to Hypothesis 1 on p. 7 as follows: 
 
We posit that the shareholder value created by flexibility increases with the quality of those managerial decisions 
and, following agency theory, that equity incentives improve these decisions by aligning managerial incentives 
toward maximizing the value of equity. The better decisions induced by higher managerial incentives impact the 
use of make-whole call provisions through two potential channels that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
First, better motivated managers can be expected to make better decisions in the future (i.e., subsequent to bond 
issue); in particular, they will be expected to make more effective use of the financial flexibility afforded by a 
make-whole call option to maximize shareholder value. Second, better motivated managers make better 
decisions at the time of issue – in particular, they are more likely to include shareholder value enhancing features, 
such as the make-whole call option. Both of these channels – i.e., the greater value a make-whole call brings 
when managers are motivated in their future decisions, and the greater propensity of currently motivated 
managers to seize the opportunity to create value at the time of issue – imply a make-whole call option will be 
more often included when managerial equity incentives are stronger. This argument motivates Hypothesis 1: 
 
In Table 5, we include an explicit test of both channels, as we describe on p. 18: 
 
We argue above that higher executive equity incentives potentially affect make-whole call choice through two 
channels, where equity incentives (1) motivate better use of the flexibility associated with the MWC provision 
in the future when opportunities to make use of financial flexibility arise, and (2) motivate managers to choose 
valuable flexibility-increasing options for the firm at the time of the bond issue that may include MWC debt. 
Given this distinction in timing, Columns 2-5 measures equity incentives using logged Delta at the time of the 
issue, while Columns 6-9 use logged Delta lagged one year. Although the two channels are not mutually 
exclusive, and lagged and contemporaneous delta are correlated, we would expect to see a stronger effect from 
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contemporaneous Delta if expected future decision quality is most important (Channel 1), and from the lagged 
Delta if decision quality at the time of issue matters more (Channel 2). 
 
While both lagged measures remain statistically significant in their respective MWC category equations, the lagged 
estimates lessen in magnitude and statistical significance compared to the contemporaneous measures. As such, these 
results suggest that the dominant effect rests with the first channel. Accordingly, we focus the subsequent analysis 
on the contemporaneous deltas, as we explain on p. 19.   
 
While not absolutely necessary, it would be nice to provide more context around the specific channel driving this 
connection between MWC and equity incentives. For example, if the argument is that properly incentivized managers 
are more likely to make good investment decisions and hence, they are more likely to benefit from exercising the 
MWC provisions on the debt, an easy to test implication would be that MWC provisions are more likely to be 
exercised if equity incentives are higher. Is that the case? The test can be easily designed either around the difference 
in difference analysis in section 5.2 or as a stand-alone logit regression.  
 
We agree that an association between equity incentives and early retirements due to call exercises or tender offers 
would add more context to the results. We utilized the FISD Redemptions file to address this question, where we 
created a binary dependent variable equal to one if the FISD item ACTION_TYPE, which provides information 
about the type of action that changed the bond’s amount outstanding, is equal to “B” (balance of issue called), “E” 
(entire issue called), “P” (part of issue called), or “T” (tender offer), and is zero otherwise. We estimated a series of 
logit models using the full FISD-based sample and on growth-based subsets per our findings in Table 8. Consistent 
with our growth-based findings in Table 8, logged Delta is significantly positively associated with reductions in 
issue amounts due to early exercise or tender offers among higher growth MWC issuers. We include these results 
below as Appendix Table 1. Because this analysis is restricted to the FISD Redemptions file, and not the aggregated 
SDC+FISD data used in the paper, the number of observations is considerably less than those used in the paper. For 
this reason and for brevity, we leave these results untabulated in the manuscript but could include them in the paper 
upon further editorial guidance. We provide details of this analysis on p. 23 as follows: 
 
A natural question is if the positive incremental MWC effect among the highest Delta tercile issuers is 
associated with actual subsequent reductions in the amount outstanding due to call exercises or tender offers. 
While the SDC database does not provide this information, the FISD Redemptions file provides data items 
about the type of action that took place to change the amount outstanding (ACTION_TYPE), along with the 
date the change to the issue’s amount outstanding became effective (EFFECTIVE_DATE). We examine the 
impact of Delta on the probability of a reduction in amount outstanding due to early exercises (i.e. when 
ACTION_TYPE is “B”, “E”, or “P”), or “T” (tender offer) for all make-whole callable bonds and for growth-
based subsets per the results in Table 8. To improve the efficiency of the estimates based on the lower 
number of observations, we gauge high and low growth using the cross-sectional medians. The controls are 
at the bond- (logged remaining maturity and offering amount), firm- (S&P Quality Ranking, growth 
measures, and size), and market levels (Baa-Aaa spread and yield curve slope). Consistent with the results 
provided in Table 8, our findings suggest that logged CEO delta (alternatively, top management delta) is 
significantly associated with early redemptions among higher growth MWC issuers, thereby providing more 
context for the channel that drives the association between MWC and equity incentives. For brevity we leave 
these results untabulated but they are available upon request. 
 
2. Sample formation and characteristics.  
• Classification of MWC vs FPC. The current classification of what constitutes MWC vs FPC seems fairly ad-hoc 
to me. Is this driven by the way the information is presented in SDC/FISD? It would be nice for the reader to get a 
sense of how these categories have evolved through time (this will also help with comparing the sample with other 
studies). It would be helpful to include a graph with either numbers or percentages for each category by year.  
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Essentially, these classifications address the issue of overlapping FPC and MWC provisions within the same bonds. 
While SDC and FISD describe these provisions somewhat differently, the broadest classification of a MWC 
provision is if the SDC item “Call Protection” is “Make Whole Call” or when the FISD items “Callable” and 
“Make_Whole” are “Y” and “Y”, respectively. Similarly, the broadest classification of a FPC provision is if the SDC 
item “Call Protection” is other than “Non-call life” or when the FISD items “Callable” and “Make_whole” are “Y” 
and “N”, respectively. Our classifications follow a more nuanced ‘dominant characteristic’ approach, based on the 
procedure described by Brown and Powers (2018, pp. 13-14).1 
 
Nevertheless, as we illustrate below in Appendix Table 2, the significant Delta effect on the probability of MWC 
issuance is preserved using the broadest MWC definition. To illustrate, we estimate logit regressions where the 
dependent variable equals one if the bond has any make-whole provision and zero otherwise (Columns 2-3) and, 
alternatively, where the dependent variable equals one if the bond has any fixed-price call provision and zero 
otherwise (Columns 4-5). In Columns 2-3, the logged Delta significantly predicts MWC issuance at the five percent 
(one percent) levels using delta measured at the CEO (top management) levels, respectively. In Columns 4-5, the 
Delta estimates are insignificantly different from zero.  
 
We have provided a more detailed overview of the classification process on p. 12 as follows: 
 
Characterizing a bond as make-whole callable and fixed-price callable is complicated by the existence of many 
bonds that contain features of both provisions. For example, a bond may have a make-whole call provision for 
the first several years of a bond’s life which is followed by a standard fixed-price call provision. As a result, 
overlapping call provision features would confound the interpretation of our multinomial estimates. Similar to 
the process described by Brown and Powers (2018, pp. 13-14), we employ a ‘dominant characteristic’ 
classification scheme using information provided by the FISD and SDC datasets to classify bonds into three 
categories according to whether a provision is exercisable over a supermajority (2/3s or more) of the bond’s life. 
We define make-whole callable bonds as (1) those that are always make-whole callable or (2) make-whole 
callable with a fixed-price call in the final third of the bond’s life. We define bonds that are fixed-price callable 
as (1) callable immediately, where the first call date is less than 90 days after the issue date, or (2) with call 
protection, where the first call date is at least 90 days after the issue date, or (3) with make-whole call protection. 
Straight bonds do not have either call feature.  
 
We added Figure 1 to the paper to illustrate the proportion of each call provision type by year in our sample. The 
increasing prevalence of MWC bonds throughout our sample period lines up with related work including Elsaify and 
Roussanov (2016), Brown and Powers (2018), Afik, Jacoby, Stangeland and Wu, (2019), and Alderson, Lin and 
Stock (2017) as we note in the paper.  
 
• Bond- and firm-level Characteristics. The paper presents the descriptive stats for bond and firm level 
characteristics only at the whole sample level. However, it would be interesting to see these variables grouped by 
MWC, FPC and non-callable just to get an idea if there are any significant differences between issuers of different 
types of bonds. Specifically, it would be informative to split up variables presented in Table 2, panels B1, B2 and C.  
 
As suggested, we added a univariate analysis to the paper (Table 3) where we compare the measures in Table 2 
panels B1-B2 and C between MWC, FPC, and straight debt. We highlight distinctions between these groups on pp. 
14-15. As we summarize on p. 15, Table 3 broadly illustrates that MWC issuers have higher delta and exhibit 
characteristics associated with greater financial flexibility, while FPC issuers have lower delta and have 
characteristics associated with greater cash flow uncertainty and higher credit risk.  
                                                          
1 Güntay, Prabhala and Unal (2004) follow a conceptually similar approach in classifying fixed-price callable bonds. As they 
note on p. 12, “For example, a 30-year bond could be callable after 29 years, thus allowing the issuer some flexibility on timing 
the refunding in the last year of a bond's life. Such a bond is better classified as a noncallable bond.” 
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3. Research Design for Testing H1/H2  
The current write-up presents two different tests to investigate the connection between equity incentives and issuance 
of MWC (i.e. the proposed H1 and H2):  
1. The probit test (presented in T3) restricts the sample to either (1)MWC and non-callable bonds or to (2) FPC and 
non-callable bonds. The results from these two samples are then compared and contrasted  
2. The multinomial logit test (presented in T4) considers the whole sample in a multinomial logit setting where the 
left hand side variable covers three levels of call protection (MWC, FPC and non-callable as the base group).  
 
Testing of H1: The first type of test presumes that the manager can choose only between MWC and non-callable 
bonds (or FPC and non-callable bonds, respectively), rather than a full menu of options. In this type of test, it is not 
straight forward to compare the coefficients between models 1, 2 and models 3,4 – the way the test is structured 
these coefficients effectively capture the differences between MWC and the base group with the differences between 
the FPC and the base group, respectively. The second type of test makes much more sense to me compared to the 
first, and yet it is only presented as an after-fact.  
 
In the revised manuscript, we removed the initial probit tests and focused the analyses on the multinomial approach 
beginning with Table 5. We retained the IV probit approach in Table 6 as we are unaware of an equivalent 
instrumental variable approach in the multinomial framework. 
 
Testing of H2: Again, I would probably consider the multinomial logit (panels C and D) as the preferred 
methodology, rather than the probit model that current Table 6 starts with (panels A and B). On a side note, does it 
not make more sense to include a dummy/interaction term rather than running the test in separate terciles/categories 
(the advantage being that we can directly test whether the difference in coefficients between the two groups is 
statistically significant)?  
 
Because proximity to financial distress and growth opportunities are characteristics that moderate the empirical 
prediction of Hypothesis 1, we have renamed the predictions associated with these characteristics Hypotheses 1a-1b, 
respectively. We examine all three hypotheses with the multinomial logit approach. In Hypothesis 1b (the growth 
based subset analysis), we use Delta × [high growth subset] interactions to test the difference in coefficients between 
the high growth subset of issuers and the rest of the sample as suggested. Consistent with our findings in the first 
submission, these interactions are strongly statistically significant. This analysis appears in Table 8. For consistency, 
we also use interactions in Table 10 to test if equity incentives impact the incremental effect of MWC provisions on 
at-issue yield spreads. Likewise, these results are consistent with the subset-based results in the first submission. 
 
Additional Comments 
  
1. How is the link between managerial incentives and issuance of MWC affected by financial distress/bankruptcy? 
One of the interesting things about MWC provisions is that they entail certain risks in the event of bankruptcy – for 
example, in the event of bankruptcy by an issuer, make-whole premiums may be treated as unmatured interest, and 
the payment of unmatured interest is generally prohibited in a bankruptcy. Additionally, the alignment of incentives 
between managers and shareholders (as well as shareholders and bondholders for that matter) are notoriously 
disturbed as the firm goes deeper into financial distress. Given that, it would be interesting to see whether financial 
distress mitigates the connection between managerial incentives and MWC (the main tests could be repeated in two 
subsamples separated by financial distress characteristics). 
 
This was an excellent suggestion that we implemented as Hypothesis 1a and developed as follows on pp. 7-8: 
 
The postulated relation between executive equity compensation and the quality of future decision-making 
associated with make-whole provisions generates several additional testable subset-based hypotheses. To the 
extent that anticipated future managerial decisions influence make-whole call choice, then the association 
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between managerial equity incentives and the use of make-whole provisions should be moderated by firm 
characteristics that weaken (strengthen) the importance of these decisions. Closer proximity to bankruptcy 
should be associated with less manager-shareholder interest alignment and therefore a weakened sensitivity 
between managerial equity incentives and the use of the make-whole call option for two potential reasons. First, 
make-whole premiums are treated as unmatured interest in the event of a bankruptcy, and the payment of 
unmatured interest in a bankruptcy is disallowed under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, 
restrictions on an issuer’s ability to prepay make-whole callable debt may diminish the hypothesized association 
between executive incentives and the use of make-whole provisions in financially distressed firms. Second, 
extant work argues that financial distress associated with high debt exacerbates manager-shareholder incentive 
misalignment. For example, Ortiz-Molina (2007) finds that capital structure affects CEO incentives where pay-
performance sensitivity declines in the proportion of straight debt, thereby supporting the view that firms trade 
off shareholder-manager incentive alignment in order to reduce shareholder-bondholder conflicts of interest that 
increase in the proportion of non-convertible debt financing. These arguments motivate Hypothesis 1a: 
 
We present these results in Table 7. In line with this expectation, equity incentives significantly predict MWC 
issuance among the subset of firms with better credit quality (gauged by firms with ‘B+’ or higher S&P Firm Quality 
Ranking, and alternatively with investment grade Moody’s bond ratings), and diminish in significance in the lower 
quality subset.  
 
2. Diff in diff test (matching technique) – the results from the diff in diff test are relatively weak. I cannot help but 
wonder if the matching technique does not drive these results (for example, based on the argument made in point 1 
above, one could argue that matching on credit rating may also be necessary). One way to potentially mitigate this 
concern is to implement a propensity score matching approach (see Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) so that you can 
simultaneously match on multiple dimensions.  
 
We replaced the prior diff-in-diff analysis in Section 5.2 with a PSM approach as suggested. As we describe on p. 
24,  
 
To ensure that our PSM estimates meet the balancing requirement, we parsimoniously select covariates 
gauging performance, leverage, and firm size. We identify control firms from the Compustat database after 
excluding financials and utilities along with the set of MWC issuers. We estimate propensity scores based on 
the following model:  
 
𝑀𝑊𝐶 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡  (2) 
 
We examine three alternative outcome measures measured over the two years subsequent to the issue: top-
line sales growth over the two-year post-issue period, and bottom-line performance as measured by ROA in t 
and t+1 relative to the issue year. The first covariate is motivated by Barber and Lyon (1996), who stress the 
importance of matching on pre-event operating performance to assess abnormal future performance. As such, 
we use ROA in year t (five-year prior growth in sales) as a matching covariate when the outcome measure is 
subsequent ROA (subsequent two-year sales growth, respectively). Following the arguments underlying 
Hypothesis 1a, the leverage ratio controls for proximity to distress. Finally, we include the firm size to mitigate 
biases related to size differences. Using the propensity scores estimated from Equation (2), we identify 
propensity score-matched control samples. PSM matching methodologies range from one-to-one to one-to-
many; as discussed by Tucker (2010), there is no single best matching approach. We employ the nearest-neighbor 
approach with replacement using a caliper of 0.1, which identifies a single match for each treated firm according 
to the closest propensity score. For robustness, we repeat the analysis using five matched firms for each treated 
firm and present results in Panel C2.  
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As we discuss in the paper, our choice of covariates in Equation (2) is based on parsimony, prior research that stresses 
the role of matching on performance (i.e., Barber and Lyon, 1996), and proximity to distress as noted in Comment 
2. We present our PSM results in Table 9. Consistent with the notion that managerial engagement subsequent to 
make-whole callable bond issue increases with equity incentives, the results show that high delta MWC issuers 
experience higher post-issue top-line (revenue) growth as well as bottom-line (ROA) performance.  
 
3. The control variables in equation 1 are potentially very highly correlated (without a correlation matrix, it is hard 
to make a definitive statement). This creates a potential multi-collinearity problem – this needs to be discussed and 
mitigated.  
 
We removed two control variables from the previous submission’s models that were redundant, and likely highly 
correlated, with the other measures: Altman’s Z-score, and the stock bid-ask spread. We conducted a variance 
inflation factor analysis on the remaining measures in our primary analysis (Tables 5-8). As we point out on p. 18, 
the variance inflation factors for these measures range from 3.59 (Firm size) to 1.03 (Delaware), indicating that our 
subsequent logistic regression coefficient estimates are reliable and stable. We also provide a correlation matrix for 
the variables used in the difference-in-means analysis – this appears as Table 4 in the revised manuscript.   
 
4. Positioning the paper in the literature – I think the authors do a good job at highlighting the main contribution of 
the paper, which is the link between managerial incentives and the issuance of MWC. However, the paper would 
benefit from a deeper discussion of the evolution of MWC provisions in bond issuances, especially in an international 
context.  
 
We have added greater detail about the evolution of MWC debt issuance on p. 1. For the sake of brevity, we refer to 
Afik et al. (2019), Mann and Powers (2003), and Labbé (2014), who also document the evolution of the make-whole 
provision outside the US. This material is as follows: 
 
As Afik, Jacoby, Stangeland and Wu (2019) discuss, the make-whole provision can be traced to the ‘Canada-
call’ provision beginning in 1987 when Domtar Inc. issued a CAN$100 million 24-year maturity debenture that 
contained a make-whole call. This preceded the first use of a make-whole callable bond (by Quaker State) in the 
US by eight years (Mann and Powers, 2003). As documented by Labbé (2014), the use of the make-whole call 
in Europe began in 2001 with a euro bond issued by AT&T and by 2012 was being issued by large European 
firms including Pirellli, Vivendi, Michelin, and France Telecom among others. 
 
5. The arguments for the first three hypotheses are very well laid out. In contrast, there is not much context provided 
for the fourth hypotheses (the reduction in asymmetric information around MWC bond issuance and how this could 
potentially vary based on equity incentives). The paper would benefit from a better literature review in relation to 
this particular hypothesis.  
 
We have focused this hypothesis on abnormal trading volume around MWC issuance, based on the premise that 
higher delta should lead to greater investor agreement on the motivation for the MWC provision and therefore less 
incentive to trade. As such, we removed the abnormal bid-ask spread analysis in this version. We develop Hypothesis 
4 as follows on p. 10: 
 
The financial flexibility explanation also has implications for the nature of the information conveyed to the 
equity market by the issue of a bond with a make-whole call option. Trading volume is an indicator of the 
precision of this information. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) argue that trading volume captures willingness of 
investors to transact. While trading volume increases on the arrival of company-specific information (e.g. 
Bamber, Barron and Stevens, 2011; Hong and Stein, 2007), Karpoff (1986) argues that investors’ willingness to 
trade arises from dispersion in prior expectations and idiosyncratic interpretation of information events. In a 
similar vein, Kandel and Pearson (1995) asserts that trading activity is stimulated when investors share, but 
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interpret differently, the same public information. The previous hypotheses rest on the argument that higher 
levels of executive equity compensation are expected to lead to future uses of financial flexibility that are, on 
average, more advantageous for shareholders. It seems natural to extend this argument to postulate that the 
variance of these decisions around the optimum will also be reduced when managers are better motivated. This 
leads to the conjecture that higher levels of executive equity compensation create the expectation of more 
consistent decision-making, which reduces investor disagreement about the valuation impact of the bond issue, 
and therefore the volume of trade around the time of issue:  
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Appendix Table 1 for Response to Reviewer 
Managerial Equity Incentives and Early Redemptions of Make-Whole Callable Bonds 
This table provides logit regression estimates where the dependent variable equals one for a given bond if FISD data item 
ACTION_TYPE = “B” (balance of issue called), “E” (entire issue called), “P” (part of issue called), or “T” (tender offer), 
and is zero otherwise. The control variables include logged CEO (alternatively, top management) delta, the logged remaining 
maturity of the bond as of the date the on which the change to the issue's amount outstanding became effective, the log of 
the issue’s offering amount, the S&P firm quality rating at issue, prior sales growth and the market-book ratio, firm size, 
interest rate measures at the time of issue including the Baa-Aaa spread and the slope of the yield curve, and industry and 
year fixed effects. Issuers are classified as HSG-HMB (LSG-LMB) when past sales growth and market-book are in the top 
(bottom) medians, respectively, of their cross-sectional distributions. The robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
at the firm level. P-values are provided in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 Delta = CEO Delta Delta = Top Management Delta 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 Full sample HSG-HMB LSG-LMB Full sample HSG-HMB LSG-LMB 
Log (Delta) -0.0014 0.3655** -0.1084 -0.0733 0.3563* -0.2276* 
 (0.985) (0.028) (0.285) (0.392) (0.051) (0.066) 
Log (remaining maturity) -0.4523*** -0.7370*** -0.4961*** -0.4499*** -0.7327*** -0.4943*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (offering amount) 0.2739* -0.1384 0.2771 0.2674* -0.1116 0.2635 
 (0.051) (0.703) (0.190) (0.055) (0.747) (0.213) 
S&P firm quality rating at issue -0.1332** -0.3874*** -0.0500 -0.1218** -0.3748*** -0.0250 
 (0.026) (0.008) (0.545) (0.038) (0.009) (0.746) 
Market-book ratio -0.2955** -0.6763** 0.7372 -0.2810** -0.6202* 0.7780 
 (0.013) (0.044) (0.307) (0.019) (0.053) (0.292) 
Sales growth -4.0725*** -1.7483 -5.7786** -3.9558*** -1.7908 -6.1974*** 
 (0.000) (0.702) (0.010) (0.000) (0.695) (0.007) 
Firm size -0.1756 -0.1702 -0.1149 -0.1460 -0.1582 -0.0628 
 (0.105) (0.450) (0.464) (0.191) (0.506) (0.680) 
Baa-Aaa quality spread at issue -0.9131** -1.3249 -0.2100 -0.9266** -1.2863 -0.2198 
 (0.013) (0.184) (0.679) (0.013) (0.191) (0.666) 
Yield curve slope at issue -0.1118 -0.7492*** 0.2440 -0.1137 -0.7487*** 0.2436 
 (0.282) (0.005) (0.242) (0.274) (0.004) (0.241) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 2,886 767 781 2,886 767 781 
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.230 0.107 192.18 0.225 0.112 
Wald chi-square 190.83 66.80 79.55 0.119 69.51 78.35 
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Appendix Table 2 for Response to Reviewer 
Logit Regression Estimates Using the Broadest Definitions of Make-Whole Callable and Fixed-Price 
Callable Bonds 
 
     
 MWC Bonds and Non-MWC Bonds FPC Bonds and Non-FPC Bonds 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Log (CEO Delta) 0.129**  0.068  
 (0.011)  (0.134)  
Log (Top management delta)  0.154***  0.061 
  (0.005)  (0.186) 
Log (Time to maturity) 0.901*** 0.897*** -1.016*** -1.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (Offering amount) 0.816*** 0.809*** 0.799*** 0.779*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule 144A -1.078*** -1.034*** 0.537*** 0.563*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Granularity 0.036 0.037 -0.371*** -0.369*** 
 (0.355) (0.320) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock-Treasury Corr. 0.403 0.337 0.897*** 0.761** 
 (0.344) (0.431) (0.004) (0.014) 
Market-book ratio 0.009 0.027 -0.045 -0.045 
 (0.921) (0.757) (0.500) (0.483) 
Sales growth -0.489 -0.617 -0.562 -0.392 
 (0.385) (0.251) (0.154) (0.307) 
Firm size -0.267*** -0.275*** -0.137 -0.141 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.183) (0.161) 
Liquidity -0.687 -0.940 0.119 -0.064 
 (0.252) (0.112) (0.764) (0.874) 
Delaware -1.578*** -1.560*** 0.590* 0.635** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.057) (0.037) 
Leverage -0.948 -1.379* 0.412 0.493 
 (0.242) (0.099) (0.387) (0.311) 
ROA 0.721 0.577 0.131 0.263 
 (0.441) (0.502) (0.873) (0.754) 
Std. ROA -0.131 -0.136 -0.035 -0.032 
 (0.404) (0.415) (0.631) (0.648) 
Tangibility -0.088 -0.076 0.084 0.102 
 (0.384) (0.449) (0.312) (0.223) 
Risk-adjusted stock return -0.089 -0.058 0.113 0.125 
 (0.526) (0.677) (0.272) (0.216) 
Analyst coverage 0.149 0.162* 0.112 0.121 
 (0.123) (0.086) (0.169) (0.127) 
Yield curve slope -9.522 -9.154 -17.659*** -16.854** 
 (0.287) (0.300) (0.008) (0.010) 
10-year Treasury rate -11.474 -10.833 9.025 7.407 
 (0.397) (0.416) (0.382) (0.464) 
Std. (10-year Treasury rate) 9.565 4.223 -30.785 -34.480 
 (0.804) (0.912) (0.320) (0.258) 
Baa-Aaa spread -3.284 -4.770 33.681** 31.440** 
 (0.888) (0.835) (0.021) (0.028) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Obs. 7,456 7,657 7,456 7,657 
Pseudo R-squared 0.284 0.284 0.207 0.205 
Wald Chi-squared 510.35 517.44 513.08 518.95 
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